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Post-colonial Africa views economic integration as an endogenous
means for attaining self-reliant, sustainable development. Working under
various regional and sub-regional economic institutions, states elaborated
several norms in search of legitimacy in economic competence. However,
several political and economic pathogens, including weak institutions, have
blighted those efforts. This paper interrogates the African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFTA or CFTA), which is the latest attempt to reboot the
integration drive and achieve sustainable development. The CFTA seeks to
create a geographic zone where goods and services will move freely among
member states by removing trade distortions and boosting factor mobility,
competition, and investment. After a rigorous analysis of the relevant
normative instruments and examining the vertical and horizontal
relationship between the CFTA and regional economic communities
(RECs)/member states, the paper articulates some objective criteria for
measuring the CFTA’s effectiveness. It concludes that, if faithfully
implemented, the CFTA could maximize utility and increase welfare. For the
analysis and conclusions, the paper deploys principles of public
international law as well as economic theories, with a blend of political and
moral philosophy.
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“The task ahead is great indeed, heavy is the responsibility; and yet it
is a noble and glorious challenge. A challenge which calls for the courage
to believe, the courage to dare, the courage to do, the courage to fight, the
courage to achieve.”1
I.

IN LIEU OF AN INTRODUCTION

The establishment and full operationalization of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA or CFTA) will be the culmination of
Africa’s long quest for economic integration. Post-independence states and
generations of Pan-Africanists have always recognized the necessity for
cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural fields.2 The Organization
of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963 to provide a platform for such
cooperation among the newly independent states.3 At the summits leading to
its founding, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, then the leading PanAfricanist, urged states to combine their economies into sub-regional
markets and ultimately create one African Common Market (ACM). He also
called for a political union based on a common foreign and monetary policy,
defense, citizenship, currency, and an African Central Bank (ACB). His
logic was that there can be no economic integration and freedom without a
political union.4 Many of Africa’s moderate leaders did not accept
Nkrumah’s federalist and radical ideas. From the menu of Pan-African
proposals tabled by the federalists, collective Africa only managed to
establish an African Development Bank (ADB) in 1963 to finance economic
and social development in the continent.5

1. H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson, Afr. Union Comm’n, Address at the Handover
Ceremony of AfCFTA Buildings to African Union (AU) (Aug. 17, 2020) [hereinafter Statement by
Mahamat] (quoting Kwame Nkrumah, Former Ghana Prime Minister, Address to the National Assembly
(June 12, 1965)).
2. See PETER J. SCHRAEDER, AFRICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY: A MOSAIC IN TRANSFORMATION
253 (2d ed. 2004) (noting the consensus among early African leaders that pan-Africanism constituted a
worthy foreign policy goal).
3. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, art. 2(2), May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39
(entered into force Sept. 13, 1963).
4. Cf. KWAME NKRUMAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE 163 (1963) (discussing the need to create a
common currency and pool African cash crops to attain a better commanding position in the market and
use united selling policies to get better prices and resist undercutting tactics of buyers).
5. See Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, art. 1, Aug. 4, 1963, 510 U.N.T.S.
3.
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The creation of the East African Community (EAC) in 19666 was
perhaps one of “the most far-reaching of early integration attempts in
Africa.”7 The idea of a CFTA also gestated in the 1970s. In 1973, the OAU
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (“OAU Assembly”) adopted
the Declaration on African Cooperation, Development and Economic
Independence.8 The Declaration set out the basic principles for collective or
individual actions by states in several areas, including transport and
communications, infrastructure, industrialization, and monetary and trade
cooperation.9 Three years after, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted the
Kinshasa Declaration calling for the establishment of an African Economic
Community (AEC) within a period of 15 to 25 years.10 The OAU took a giant
step towards realizing this aspiration when it adopted the Lagos Plan of
Action (LPA) and Final Act in 1980,11 and the AEC Treaty in 1991.12 But no
sooner had the AEC Treaty entered into force in 1994 than the integration
project went into hibernation. States failed to meet agreed timelines, besides
the lack of political will in fulfilling other treaty obligations.13 It took a
refurbished regional organization to rejig Africa’s integration and

6. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, May 5, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 633. A
Revised EAC Treaty was adopted in Arusha, Tanzania on Nov. 30, 1999. Treaty for the Establishment of
the East African Community, art. 27(1), Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter Revised EAC
Treaty].
7. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR., ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA, at 28, U.N.
Sales No. E.04.II.K.3 (2004) [hereinafter UNECA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION] (“The
community . . . reflects Africa’s desire to transform itself from a continent of predominantly least
developed and developing economies into a strong united bloc of nations . . . .”).
8. African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence, Assembly of
the Heads of State and Government, Tenth Ordinary Session, CM/ST.12(XXI) (May 25, 1973),
https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/5947/African%20Declaration%20on%20Cooperatio
n%20Development%20and%20Economic%20Independence_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
The
Declaration followed the recommendation of the African Ministerial Conference on Trade, Development
and Monetary Problems held in Abidjan from May 9 to 13, 1973. Id. at 1.
9. See Stephen Karangizi, The Regional Economic Communities, in THE AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 233–34 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Fatsah Ouguergou eds., 2012) (citing
Strategy and Approach to the Implementation of the African Economic Community Treaty, AEC
Economic and Social Commission, First Session, AEC/ECOSOC3(1)Rev.1 (June 6, 1996)).
10. See id.
11. Org. of African Unity [OAU], Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa
1980–2000 (Apr. 1980) [hereinafter LPA], https://www.nepad.org/publication/lagos-plan-of-action.
12. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, adopted June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1245
[hereinafter AEC Treaty] (entered into force May 12, 1994).
13. See generally Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The African Economic Community:
Emancipation for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure, 24 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 601,
602 (1999) (analyzing the AEC’s chances of success before concluding significant reforms are necessary
for the AEC to succeed); Kwaku Danso, The African Economic Community: Problems and Prospects, 42
AFR. TODAY 31, 31 (1995) (evaluating the AEC and the challenges of African continental integration
through a common market).
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development vision. The African Union (AU), established in 200014 and
inaugurated in 2002, replaced the OAU as Africa’s inter-governmental
institution for political, security, and economic governance.15
The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (“AU
Assembly”) Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking the
CFTA of 201216 was, perhaps, the most direct step towards actualizing the
integration vision post the AU’s inauguration. The Assembly reiterated that
promoting intra-African trade is fundamental to “sustainable economic
development, employment generation and effective integration of Africa into
the global economy.”17 It endorsed “the Framework, Road Map and
Architecture for Fast Tracking the establishment of the [CFTA] and the
Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade” and urged the High Level
African Trade Committee (HATC) to “provide a facilitating role and unlock
any blockages that might arise.”18 Three years later, the Assembly
inaugurated the AfCFTA negotiations to integrate Africa’s markets in line
with the objectives and principles enunciated in the AEC Treaty.19 Although
Africa missed the indicative date of 2017 initially set for the

14. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 2, adopted July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AU Act] (entered into force May 26, 2001).
15. For some of the emerging literature on the AU, see generally NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANA, THE
AFRICAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED STUDIES (2020) [hereinafter UDOMBANA, THE
AFRICAN UNION] (examining the development and multiple functions of the AU); OLUFEMI AMAO,
AFRICAN UNION LAW: THE EMERGENCE OF A SUI GENERIS LEGAL ORDER (2018) (exploring the impact
of the AU on the existing legal order in Africa); THE AFRICAN UNION: AUTOCRACY, DIPLOMACY AND
PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA (Tony Karbo & Tim Murithi eds., 2018) (describing the AU’s new
development framework and the challenges to pan-African integration); SANDIPANI DASH, REGIONAL
RESURGENCE IN AFRICA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF AFRICAN UNION (2017) (analyzing the AU’s
mandate and the organization’s relationship to the African member countries); THE AFRICAN UNION:
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 9 (detailing the organizational structure,
operations, and objectives of the AU); DIEDRE L. BADEJO, THE AFRICAN UNION (2008) (illustrating the
development of the AU and the future of the organization); A UNITED STATES OF AFRICA? (Eddy Maloka
ed., 2001) (discussing the AU’s foundations and what steps African countries must take to ensure the
AU’s long-term survival); Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A
Legal Analysis, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 69 (2002) (offering a detailed scrutiny of the AU’s structure, legal
status, and relationship to member states).
16. See Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking the Continental Free Trade
Area, Assembly of the Union, Eighteenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.394(XVIII) (Jan. 29,
2012) [hereinafter Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade], https://au.int/sites/default/files/
decisions/9649-assembly_au_dec_391_-_415_xviii_e.pdf.
17. Id. para. 2.
18. Id. para. 3.
19. See Decision on the Launch of Continental Free Trade Area Negotiations, para. 3, Assembly
of the Union, Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.569(XXV) (June 14, 2015),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9664-assembly_au_dec_569_-_587_xxiv_e.pdf.
Actual
negotiations commenced in February 2016.
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operationalization of the CFTA,20 the Assembly adopted the Agreement
Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area on March 21, 2018.21
That historic agreement seeks to create conditions that permit the expansion
of intra-African trade and the intensification of economic cooperation among
states. It breathes life into the AEC Treaty,22 which remains the key
normative framework for evaluating Africa’s strategy for socio-economic
development. The AU Assembly also adopted three complementary
protocols with the AfCFTA Agreement to facilitate market integration.
These are the Protocol on Trade in Goods,23 the Protocol on Trade in
Services,24 and the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of
Disputes.25 The AfCFTA Agreement provides that any additional
instruments within its scope, as deemed necessary, “shall be concluded in
furtherance of the objectives of the AfCFTA and shall, upon adoption, form
an integral part of th[e] Agreement.”26 This provision clearly anticipates
additional protocols that should be elaborated on and adopted when the
ongoing negotiation rounds are completed. The three protocols under
reference do not contain separate ratification provisions; only the AfCFTA
Agreement does.27 When the Agreement enters into force, the protocols
“shall form part of the single undertaking,”28 meaning that they have the
same normative force as the principal treaty.29 This arrangement is intended
to ensure that parties to the AfCFTA Agreement do not cherry pick which
treaty obligations to implement. In the CFTA legal regime, all rights and

20. Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade, supra note 16, para. 4.
21. Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, adopted Mar. 21, 2018, 58
I.L.M. 1028 [hereinafter AfCFTA AGT] (entered into force May 30, 2019).
22. See id., pmbl. (noting the launch of negotiations to establish the AfCFTA was to integrate
Africa’s markets “in line with the objectives and principles enunciated in the Abuja Treaty . . . .”)
(emphasis in the original).
23. AfCFTA AGT, Protocol on Trade in Goods, Mar. 21, 2018, 58 I.L.M. 1028, 1043 [hereinafter
Protocol on Trade in Goods].
24. AfCFTA AGT, Protocol on Trade in Services, Mar. 21, 2018, 58 I.L.M. 1028, 1053 [hereinafter
Protocol on Trade in Services].
25. AfCFTA AGT, Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes, at 54, Mar.
21, 2018, 58 I.L.M. 1028, 1067 [hereinafter Protocol on DSM Rules].
26. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 8(3).
27. See id. art. 22.
28. Id. art. 8(2). The “single undertaking” device approximates the legal framework of the
Marrakesh Agreement. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 2(2), Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh AGT]. Only the Plurilateral Trade Agreements do
not create either rights or obligations for members that have not accepted them. Id. art. 2(3).
29. Cf. Customs Régime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 41, at 47 (Sept. 5) (“From the standpoint of the obligatory character of international engagements, it
is well known that such engagements may be taken in the form of treaties, conventions, declarations,
agreements, protocols, or exchanges of notes.”).
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obligations go together. The Agreement even prohibits any reservation,30 the
rationale being to preserve the integrity of the undertakings, which parties
value higher than any effort at larger participation.31
Timely ratification of treaties is not a virtue in Africa. Many regional
treaties are yet to enter into force, more than a decade since their adoption.32
The AfCFTA Agreement is a refreshing exception to the norm. It entered
into force within thirteen months of its adoption—on May 30, 2019—after
meeting the 22 ratification threshold.33 All AU members, minus Eritrea, have
signed the AfCFTA Agreement. Twenty-eight, or 50.9 percent, of the 55 AU
members have ratified it.34 The unprecedented record of attainment of the
minimum ratifications evinces a commitment to fast-track the CFTA, at least
in principle. In the likely event of all the AfCFTA Agreement attaining
general ratification, the CFTA will cover a population of 1.3 billion.35 With
an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion, it will be the
world’s largest free trade zone since the establishment of the WTO in 1995.36
30. See AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 25; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19(a),
May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
(permitting such prohibition).
31. ROBERT KOLB, THE LAW OF TREATIES: AN INTRODUCTION 72 (2016) (“This is true for
institutional schemes, which can function only on the basis of one single set of rules.”).
32. See, e.g., Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-operation Program,
Aug. 1, 1975, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36408-treaty-0007_-_inter-african_convention_
establishing_an_african_technical_co-operation_programme_e.pdf (not yet in force); Convention for the
Establishment of the African Centre for Fertilizer Development, July 1, 1985,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7772-treaty-0012_-_convention_for_the_establishment_of_the_
african_centre_for_fertilizer_development_e.pdf (not yet in force); African Maritime Transport Charter,
June
11,
1994,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37306-treaty-0017_-_african_maritime_
transport_charter_e.pdf (not yet in force); Charter for African Cultural Renaissance, Jan. 24, 2006,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37305-treaty-0032_-_charter_for_african_cultural_renaissance_
e.pdf (not yet in force); Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, adopted
July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 317 [hereinafter Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol] (not yet in force); Protocol on the
African Investment Bank, June 30, 2009, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36414-treaty-0038__protocol_on_the_african_investment_bank_e.pdf (not yet in force).
33. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 23(1). Only the AU Act, which was adopted on July 11,
2000 and entered into force within ten months on May 26, 2001, rivals the AfCFTA Agreement.
34. African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Legal Texts and Policy Documents, TRALAC,
https://www.tralac.org/resources/our-resources/6730-continental-free-trade-area-cfta.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2020). For the ratification status of the AfCFTA Agreement, see African Union [AU], List of
Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental
Free
Trade
Area
(Oct.
8,
2019)
[hereinafter
AfCFTA,
Ratification
Status],
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-sl-AGREEMENT%20ESTABLISHING%20THE%20
AFRICAN%20CONTINENTAL%20FREE%20TRADE%20AREA%20%282%29.pdf.
35. African Countries by Population, WORLDOMETERS [hereinafter WORLDOMETERS],
https://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-africa-by-population/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
36. African Continental Free Trade Area—Questions & Answers, UNECA, [hereinafter UNECA,
Q&A],
https://www.uneca.org/archive/publications/african-continental-free-trade-area-questionsanswers (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
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Some notable economies that have ratified the AfCFTA Agreement include
South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, and Kenya,37 representing a combined
population of roughly 246 million.38 However, some notable economies that
have not yet ratified include Nigeria with a GDP per capita of $2,229.90 as
of 2019,39 Angola with a GDP per capita of $2,973.60,40 Algeria with a GDP
per capita of $3,948.30,41 and Morocco with a GDP per capita of $3,204.10.42
The four countries have a combined population of roughly 319 million.43
More states will hopefully ratify in the near future, after a cost-benefit
analysis on the potential benefits of an integrated regional economy.
Some commentators opine that Africa has largely turned its backs on
the rhetoric of a ‘new international economic order’ (NIEO)44 to embrace
more modern, liberal, economic dogmas.45 They could readily point to the
AfCFTA Agreement to support their position. The Agreement embraces
some neo-liberal principles, including trade liberalization.46 Neo-liberalism,
sometimes called the ‘Washington Consensus,’ insists that only the
‘invisible hands’ of free trade should allocate labor, capital, and
technological resources in order to ensure prosperity and protect democracy
from despotism.47 A variant of this ideology is libertarianism, which holds,
among other tenets, that governments have no social responsibilities except

37. See AfCTFA, Ratification Status, supra note 34 (listing countries that have ratified the AfCFTA
Agreement).
38. WORLDOMETERS, supra note 35.
BANK,
39. GDP
Per
Capita
(Current
US$),
WORLD
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See WORLDOMETERS, supra note 35 (listing countries by population, including Nigeria,
Angola, Algeria, and Morocco).
44. The NIEO sought, inter alia, to eliminate developing countries’ economic dependence on
developed countries and to accelerate developing countries’ economies based on the principle of selfreliance. See G.A. Res. 3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(May 1, 1974) [hereinafter Declaration on NIEO] (referring to the UN Charter’s principles of promoting
economic advancement and social progress when outlining the reasons for establishing the NIEO). See
generally P.N. AGARWALA, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN OVERVIEW (2014)
(providing information about the NIEO’s influence on the world economy).
45. Cf. PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 257
(6th ed. 2011) (arguing that the creation of economic co-operation organizations alone will not overcome
structural economic problems).
46. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(b) (seeking to create a liberalized market for goods and
services).
47. See generally HANDBOOK OF NEOLIBERALISM (Simon Springer et al. eds., 2016) (providing a
comprehensive overview of neoliberalism’s theoretical underpinnings, political implications, and place
in emerging debates); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007) (showing a
panoramic view of neoliberalism and how it profiteered on the world stage).
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to maintain law and order. Sachs calls this philosophy “a grand illusion,” as
it is not grounded in history or sound economic theory.48 But critiques of
neo-liberalism have plausible reasons for concern; indeed, segments of
Africa’s civil society are skeptical of the CFTA. In an incisive essay the same
year, Kombo argued that “one of the dangers of free trade ideology is its
hegemonic foreclosure of alternatives,” and that Africa “cannot afford to be
the perpetual testing ground for unsubstantiated economic theories.”49
This paper undertakes a contextual analysis of the AfCFTA Agreement,
partly in response to the UNECA’s call to African scholars to support the
effective realization of this new development initiative.50 It examines the
context that led to the text of the Agreement, its contours, and its potential
effectiveness, particularly in a continent where states still cage themselves
in concrete walls of sovereignty. This paper demonstrates that the CFTA is
an Afrocentric vision designed to enable collective Africa to find ‘African
solutions’ to its peculiar economic challenges. It is a synthesis of free market
principles and regional specificities, as articulated in earlier instruments such
as the LPA, AEC Treaty, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD),51 AU Act, and Agenda 2063.52 Africa cannot operate in isolation
in a globalized world, so the CFTA is designed not only to enhance intraAfrican trade but also to increase Africa’s participation in the global
market.53 The paper proceeds on four main tracks. The first track examines
Africa’s quest for an endogenous development paradigm, as exemplified in
the LPA and AEC Treaty. The second track interrogates the new paradigm
represented by the AfCFTA Agreement and its protocols. It focuses on some
issues that are fundamental to the creation of an AEC/CFTA, including its
48. JEFFREY SACHS, THE PRICE OF CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING VIRTUE AND PROSPERITY AFTER
THE ECONOMIC FALL 37–38 (Rev. ed. 2012) (“[F]ree markets alone cannot begin to ensure efficiency and

prosperity; without government, we’d lack the highways, safe environment, public health, and scientific
discoveries that make us productive.”).
49. Brenda K. Kombo, What Are the Alternatives to Neoliberal Trade?, AFR. IS A COUNTRY (May
2, 2019), https://africasacountry.com/2019/05/what-are-the-alternatives-to-neoliberal-trade (calling for a
“robust intellectual engagement” to unpack the AfCFTA).
50. Shi Yinglun, ECA Official Urges African Scholars to Develop Quality Research on Free Trade
Pact, XINHUANET (Mar. 15, 2019, 1:26 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201903/15/c_137897583.htm.
51. African Union [AU], The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, paras. 7–8 (Oct. 2001)
[hereinafter NEPAD FD], https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/nepad/nepad.pdf.
52. See African Union [AU], Agenda 2063—The Africa We Want: Popular Version, paras. 9–10
(May 2016) [hereinafter Agenda 2063], https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33126-doc03_popular_version.pdf.
53. See AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(g); cf. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 66 (“Reaffirms that Agenda 2063 builds on past achievements and challenges and takes into account the
continental and global context and trends in which Africa is realizing its transformation . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
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scope of application. The third track interrogates the vertical and horizontal
relationships between the AEC/CFTA and regional economic communities
(RECs), on one hand, and member states on the other. It examines, for
example, the effect of Community law or regulations on national law. In the
final track, it highlights indicators for measuring the success of the CFTA.
The paper concludes that social justice must accompany economic growth;
that is, and must remain, the summum bonum—the ultimate goal.
Law has always played a significant role in states’ economic relations
and will continue to do so. Multilateral treaties like the AfCFTA Agreement
are important sources of international economic and institutional law. They
advance efforts towards establishing norms of global and regional
governance.54 In addition, states’ votes and views in international
organizations constitute evidence of customary law;55 likewise the practice
of the organizations themselves, which increasingly impact the development
of international (economic) law.56 International economic law, in particular,
serves as the pivot or anchor for this paper. I also call in aid decisions of AU
policy organs as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.57
All of these sources of law, alongside economic theories and political and
moral philosophy, are synthesized to advance the thesis that the CFTA is a
unique development initiative.
II. AFRICA’S QUEST FOR AN ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT
PARADIGM
Post-colonial states have tried, with mixed results, to create an
endogenous paradigm to improve the living standards of their peoples and
confront the vagaries of neo-liberal globalization. These steps have been
marked by an awareness that foreign aid, debt relief, technical assistance,
and other international strategies are inadequate to sustain development.58
Economic integration is generally seen as key to overcoming fragmentation,
promoting diversification, accelerating transformation and sustainable
development, and building cross-border linkages among productive
54. See UDOMBANA, THE AFRICAN UNION supra note 15, at 16.
55. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (1963) (“Collective acts of States, repeated by and acquiesced in by
sufficient numbers with sufficient frequency, eventually attain the status of law.”); see also UDOMBANA,
THE AFRICAN UNION, supra note 15, at 16.
56. See SIMON CHESTERMAN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS: DOCUMENTS
AND COMMENTARY 8–10 (2d ed. 2016) (emphasizing that organizations’ actions and practices can serve
as authoritative sources for interpreting treaties).
57. See Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, supra note 32, art. 31(1)(e).
58. See Muna Ndulo, African Integration Schemes: A Case Study of the Southern African
Development Community, 7 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 4–5 (1999).
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entities.59 This belief obviously motivated the many regional ‘economic
communities (RECs)’60 that sprung up in Africa in the 1960s and beyond.
The EAC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),61 the
Southern African Development Community (SADC),62 and others have
made varying progress on trade liberalization and facilitation, free mobility,
infrastructure, and even peace and security.63 However, a framework was
needed to boost, coordinate, and transform these RECs into engines for
continental economic growth. The LPA of 1980 laid the foundation for that
framework. The AEC Treaty of 1991 built on it. Both instruments were
prominent initiatives by which African states collectively sought to reengineer themselves in the last two decades of the last millennium.
In this part, I examine Africa’s long quest for endogenous development.
I begin with a note on the concept and benefits of economic integration to
serve as a literature review and provide a framework for some of the critical
issues examined in this part and the rest of the paper. I then proceed to
examine the LPA, the AEC Treaty, and the African Union’s continuing
roadmap towards an AEC. I finally attempt a preliminary assessment of these
efforts. I conclude that despite the obvious benefits of integration, few
demonstrable achievements have been evident at the continental level in
Africa. This failure obviously informs the renewed effort to integrate Africa
through the CFTA.

59. See generally MARY E. LOVELY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DOMESTIC
PERFORMANCE (2016) (discussing the influence of international economic integration on certain domestic
issues such as tax burdens, welfare policies, and environmental regulations); INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION (Franz Lang & Renate Ohr eds., 2012) (arguing that the power of international economic
integration can determine domestic tax burdens, influence welfare implications of domestic policy
alternatives, and influence the location of productive factors and their rewards); MAURICE SCHIFF & L.
ALAN WINTERS, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2003) (discussing the relationship
between regionalism and multilateralism while exploring the economic advantages of non-discriminatory
trade liberalization).
60. Defined as “corporate legal entity established by its Treaty . . . and whose objective is to
promote economic integration.” Protocol on Relations Between the African Union and the Regional
Economic Communities, art. 1, July 1, 2017 [hereinafter AU Protocol on RECs],
https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1621/Protocol_Relations_AU_RECs_E.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y.
61. For legal text, see Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Nov. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
1067 [hereinafter COMESA Treaty].
62. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116
[hereinafter SADC Treaty].
63. UNECA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION, supra note 7, at 1.
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A. Note on Economic Integration
Economic integration entails the amalgamation, regulation, and the
establishment of a common market. Trade is the building block of that tripod.
In this section, I examine the concept and benefit of integration. The exercise
serves as a prelude to the subsequent analysis of the quest for a continental
economic union, as represented in the LPA, AEC Treaty, and now the
AfCFTA Agreement.
1. The Concept of Integration
Economic integration is the fusion of two or more national economies
into one, with major economic policies decided in common. It is a selective
trade liberalization with regional partners, allowing for goods, services,
persons, and capital to circulate freely but without affecting trade relations
with third parties.64 The WTO allows its members to establish and enlarge
regional trade agreements (RTAs), subject to stringent conditions and the
requirement of notification. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)65 and the 1994 Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV66 that “substantially all the trade” between
the RTA members should be liberalized.67 It further enjoins Customs Union
members to apply substantially the same duties and other trade restrictions
to products of third parties,68 including eliminating discriminatory standards
in customs union agreements.

64. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the
African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
185, 187 (2002) [hereinafter Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony?] (referencing PHILIP MARC
RAWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 26 (2001)). See generally
André Sapir, European Integration at the Crossroads: A Review Essay on the 50th Anniversary of the
Bela Balassa’s Theory of Economic Integration, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1200 (2011) (analyzing
developments in European economic integration over the last fifty years since the publishing of Bela
Balassa’s book to present a detailed picture of the theory of economic integration through a discussion of
scale economies, imperfect competition, and economic geography).
65. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M. 1154
[hereinafter GATT 1994]; cf. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (first established version of the GATT) [hereinafter GATT 1947] (providing a
number of exceptions to the Most-Favored-Nations principle). For a detailed analysis of Article XXIV of
GATT, see JOHN. H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
452–65 (4th ed. 2002).
66. See, e.g., Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, in WTO—INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Rudiger Wolfrum et al.
eds., 2006).
67. GATT 1994, supra note 65, art. XXIV(8)(b) (referring to the greater number of free trade areas
(FTAs) since the establishment of the GATT); id. art. XXIV(8)(a)(i) (referring to the increase and greater
importance of customs unions).
68. See id. art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii).
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Critics of RTAs see them as a second-best option to integrate
developing regions into the global economy.69 Others comment on the risk
of trade diversion. This occurs when import supplies from countries outside
the region are replaced by less efficient production from countries within the
region. They argue that trade creation causes losses among non-members.70
A further argument is that RTAs are at odds with the WTO’s policies of
multilateralism and economic liberalism; and that regional deals, despite
their political appeal, are never a substitute for progress at the WTO.71
Multilateral trade rounds, they insist, are the trading system’s foundation,
based on the ‘most favored nation’ treatment—the principle that any tariff
cuts offered to one country must be offered to all. It makes no sense, says the
Economist, “to endorse regionalism at the expense of a better multilateral
system.”72 The problem with this argument is its underlying assumption, that
global trade is the sole panacea to the economic ills faced by developing
countries. The evidence does not support such an assumption.73 The failed
Doha Development Round (DDR), launched in November 2001 to free
global trade and extend the benefits of globalization to developing countries,
has only accelerated the rush to negotiate more RTAs.74 The CFTA is one
among several such RTAs that have come into force since Doha. More will
certainly follow.
2. The Potential Benefits of Integration
There is a broad consensus on the benefits of economic integration.75 It
could help to remove trade distortions and encourage competition,
investment and factor mobility, thereby allowing participating states to

69. See, e.g., Scott Flatto, Note, Too Much of a Good Thing?: Reassessing the Proliferation of
African Regional Trade Agreements, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 407, 409 (2007).
70. See Craig Jackson, Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies for Economic
Integration in Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140 n.4 (2003)
(referencing RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 635–50 (2d ed. 2001)).
71. Regional Trade Agreements: A Second-Best Choice, ECONOMIST (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12068114.
72. Id.
73. See FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL
WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Rev. ed. 2004) (countering the myth that developing
countries are well-served by the WTO).
74. See Afta Doha, Should Free Traders Applaud the Rise of Preferential Trade Deals?,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 4, 2008), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2008/09/04/afta-doha.
75. See generally J.E. Weaver, The Costs and Benefits of Economic Integration, 44 AFR. STUD.
REV. 211 (2001) (reviewing 1–4 REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA (Ademola Oyejide et al. eds., 1997)) (discussing the four-volume work’s
comprehensive study on how trade liberalization can create greater ties between Africa and the world).
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maximize utility and increase welfare.76 The liberalised market of the
participating states and the increased specialisation consistent with the law
of comparative advantage could lead to enhanced efficiency in production.77
Integration could enhance competitiveness at the industry and enterprise
level by exploiting opportunities for economies of scale, continental market
access and an efficient allocation of resources.78 It could lead to
“sustainability, increased investment, the consolidation of economic and
political reforms, increased global competitiveness, the promotion of
regional public goods, [and] the prevention of conflict.”79 The intensified
competition between firms leads to enforced changes in efficiency. And the
resulting technological advances produce changes in the amount and quality
of the factors of production.80 This could also help to stimulate the global
economy.81 Regional integration could enable states to share, in an equitable
manner, the advantages of cooperation for a balanced development.82
Integration deepens solidarity between nations; indeed, cooperative regimes
embody commitments to shared values, including democratic and pluralistic
politics.83
For Africa, integration could enable it to build resilience to global
output shocks. An empirical study has revealed that deeper integration within
the EAC helped its members to absorb such shocks during the global
financial crisis of 2007-2008.84 In contrast, the Southern Africa Custom
Union (SACU) was less able to cope during the same period partly due to
weaker regional integration.85 A pooled economy will also enable Africa to
enhance its bargaining position at the global level, thereby resulting in better
trade deals—cheaper imports from the outside and higher prices for exports.
Acting independently, African states will not have the bargaining power to
secure good or even better terms of trade in a field that has China, the E.U.,
76. Cf. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl. (linking increased investment and the
elimation of trade barriers with economic efficiency and improving welfare).
77. ALI M. EL-AGRAA, THE EUROPEAN UNION: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES 18 (7th ed. 2004).
78. Cf. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl. (resolving to enhance industry
competitiveness through leveraging economies of scale, contintental market access and efficient resource
allocation).
79. UNECA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION, supra note 7, at x.
80. See id.
81. See MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 321 (2d ed. 2016).
82. See AEC Treaty, supra note 12, pmbl.
83. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER 302 (1996).
84. For an analysis of the role between integration and ability to absorb financial shocks see, e.g.,
Mthuli Ncube et al., Can Intra-Regional Trade Act as a Global Shock Absorber in Africa? (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 1073, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2400550.
85. Id.
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India, and the U.S. among its players. One only needs to imagine China
negotiating with some weak post-colonial states—like Seychelles
(population 98,34786), Sao Tome & Principe (population 219,15987), Cape
Verde (population 555,98788), or Comoros (population 869,60189)—to
appreciate the saying that two are better than one. According to an African
proverb, if you cross the river in a crowd, you will not be eaten by the
crocodile. Of course, a pooled economy assumes that Africa maintains
common positions on trade and related issues, which is one of the goals of
the AU.90
A continental free trade area will make Africa a more attractive
investors’ destination. Africa’s economic size contains possibilities for
growth that are absent in any one of the fifty-five odd states. It is estimated
that a successful CFTA will have a combined consumer and business
spending of $6.7 trillion by 2030.91 As long as individual states attempt to
‘go it alone,’ Africa will lose out in the increasing global competition for
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).92 Few states, if any, will achieve the real
economic independence and higher living standards to which Africa
aspires.93 A harmonized rule of origin and disciplines on tariff and non-tariff
measures will make it easier for foreign firms to trade in Africa. An investor
in one state would be able to sell to, or invest, in the rest of Africa.94
B. The Lagos Plan of Action
The LPA was arguably Africa’s first concrete attempt to create a
common policy framework for a self-reliant development through the
establishment of an AEC. It was, at the time of its adoption, the most
comprehensive and systematic vision for Africa’s development.95 The

86. WORLDOMETERS, supra note 35.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 3(d); AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 94(1).
91. See Landry Signé, How Africa is Bucking the Isolationist Trend, FOREIGN AFF. (May 23, 2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-05-23/how-africa-bucking-isolationist-trend.
92. See UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, at 49–52, U.N. Doc. TD/STAT.43, U.N. Sales No.
E.19.II.D.1 (2018) (“FDI is defined as an investment reflecting a lasting interest and control by a foreign
direct investor, resident in one economy, in an enterprise resident in another economy (foreign
affiliate).”).
93. See REGINALD H. GREEN & ANN SEIDMAN, UNITY OR POVERTY? THE ECONOMICS OF PANAFRICANISM 80–81 (1968).
94. See William Davis, The African Growth and Opportunity Act and the African Continental Free
Trade Area, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 377, 381 (2017).
95. See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 22 (1996).
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Monrovia Declaration of 197996 provides insights to the nature of challenges
that states sought to address in the LPA and later the AEC Treaty. The first
was the challenge of economic and social restructuring to achieve rapid
socio-economic change and establish a solid domestic and intra-African base
for a self-sustaining and self-reliant development.97 The second was the
challenge of mobilizing political support for the restructuring.98 In response,
states committed themselves, individually and collectively, to prioritizing
human resource developments in order to eliminate illiteracy. They pledged
to put science and technology in the service of development. They pledged
to work towards self-sufficiency in food production and supply. They
pledged to co-operate in the field of natural resources control, exploration,
extraction and use for development. They pledged to develop indigenous
entrepreneurial, technical manpower and technological capabilities to
achieve individual and collective development goals. They pledged to cooperate in the preservation, protection and improvement of the natural
environment, to ensure that development policies reinforce Africa’s cultural
identity, and to take the future into account in the elaboration of development
plans.99 Following this long list of commitments, the Monrovia Declaration
called for the creation of an African Common Market (ACM) as a prelude to
an AEC.100
The LPA was the immediate successor to the Monrovia Declaration. It
references the Declaration in three preambular paragraphs,101 indicating a
common goal of self-reliance. In this section, I examine the rhetoric of selfreliance and how the destructive force of neo-liberalism derailed the LPA
vision.
1. The Rhetoric of Self-Reliance
The LPA was a classic work on endogenous development strategy, with
a rigorous and clear vision of sustainable, equitable, and poverty-reducing
growth accompanied by structural transformation.102 It was exclusively
devoted to Africa’s economic problems, describing itself as “a far-reaching
96. Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government, of the
Organization of African Unity on the Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-reliance
in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Sixteenth Ordinary Session, AHG/ST.3(XVI)Rev.1 (July
17, 1979) [hereinafter Monrovia Declaration], https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9526assembly_en_17_20_july_1979_assembly_heads_state_government_sixteenth_ordinary_session.pdf.
97. Id. pmbl.
98. See id.
99. Id. para. 4.
100. Id. para. 5.
101. LPA, supra note 11, paras. 2–4.
102. See AKE, supra note 95, at 22.
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regional approach” for the basic restructuring of Africa’s economic base,
anchored primarily on collective self-reliance.103 The LPA began with a
critical assessment of the then prevailing global development strategies,
concluding that Africa could not point a significant growth rate or
satisfactory index of general well-being after faithfully implementing the
global economic strategies.104 It added, ominously, that “if the world
economic forecast for the next decade [was] to be believed, the over-all poor
performance of the African economy over the past 20 years may even be a
golden age compared with future growth rate.”105 The LPA reflected on some
of the reasons for the continent’s woes, among them the systemic and serial
exploitation of Africa’s resources during the colonial period.106 That
exploitation, which left Africa bleeding, continued after independence
through neo-colonialism. Many external forces still seek to influence the
economic policies and directions of Africa.107 Natural and endemic diseases
“of the cruelest type” complicate the problem.108 The LPA also viewed, with
disquiet, Africa’s over-dependence on export of basic raw materials and
minerals, a phenomenon that has made African economies highly susceptible
to external developments and been detrimental to its internal interests.109 As
this paper will later articulate, this export of primary materials remains.
The LPA developed a set of guidelines for self-reliant development.110
First, that Africa’s resources must be applied principally to meet the needs
of its people. Second, that Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance
and mobilise her entire human and material resources for development, and
that external economic assistance should not be the mainstay of
development. Third, that Africa’s development and growth must be based on
a combination of natural resources, entrepreneurial, managerial and
technical resources, and a restructured and expanded market. Fourth, that
each state should pursue an all-embracing strategy of economic, social and
cultural activities by mobilising its strength to ensure equitable shared efforts
in development and its outcome. Lastly, and more relevant to this paper, that
collective Africa should renew its pursuit of economic integration for the
much-needed development based on collective self-reliance. Guided by
these principles, the OAU mapped out sectoral issues on which its members
103. LPA, supra note 11, para. 1.
104. Id. para. 1.
105. Id. para. 10.
106. Id. para. 6.
107. Id.
108. Id. para. 6.
109. Id. para. 9.
110. See generally id. para. 14 (advocating for African self-sufficiency and reducing the continent’s
total reliance on exporting raw materials).
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were required to give priority attention.111 These were agriculture, industry,
natural resources, human resource development and utilization, science and
technology, transport and communications, and trade and finance. By
concentrating on sectoral programs, the LPA envisaged structural
transformation of African economies.112 It linked self-sufficiency to Africa’s
economic integration: “We commit ourselves individually and collectively,
on behalf of our governments and peoples, to establish national, sub-regional
and regional institutions which will facilitate the attainment of objectives of
self-reliance and self-sustainment.”113 But ‘self-reliance’ was not envisaged
to result in a complete autarky or absolute national self-sufficiency.114 It was
meant to reduce dependence on foreign investment and economic assistance,
by combining extremely limited individual markets and scarce resources to
forcefully bargain for foreign capital and technology.115
A ‘Final Act’ accompanied the LPA—a Plan of Action towards
realizing the commitments made in the LPA and ensuring Africa’s
economic, social, and cultural integration.116 The Final Act provided for
strengthening existing RECs and establishing new ones where none existed.
It provided for a deepening of sectoral integration by harmonizing strategies,
policies and development plans. It enjoined the promotion of more intraAfrican trade and realization of self-sufficiency in food production. It called
for the establishment of an energy policy, improvement in transport
communications in Africa, and establishment of an African Monetary Fund
(AMF). The LPA and the Final Act laid the frameworks for the AEC Treaty
that was adopted about a decade later.
2. The Destructive Force of Uncensored Neo-liberalism
The LPA failed to deliver on its grand promises because states
surrendered decision-making autonomy to neo-liberal international financial
institutions (IFIs)—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World

111. See generally id. (promoting African economic development by concentrating on certain
sectors to boost the continent’s overall growth).
112. Olu Ajakaiye & Afeikhena Jerome, Economic Development: The Experience of Sub-Saharan
Africa, in INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS, EXPERIENCE, & PROSPECTS 732, 742 (Bruce CurrieAlder et al. eds., 2014).
113. LPA, supra note 11, para. 3(iii); cf. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(k) (espousing the “promotion
of self-reliance” as a principle).
114. Thomas J. Biersteker, Self-Reliance in Theory and Practice in Tanzanian Trade Relations, 34
INT’L ORG. 229, 231 (1980).
115. JAMES THUO GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES 30 (2011).
116. See generally LPA, supra note 11, paras. 249–65 (emphasizing the importance of intra-African
expansion and unity).
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Bank.117 In the hysteria for survival, these states capitulated to the free
market assumptions of the IFIs. They failed to make a priori impact
assessment of the neo-liberal pills on their economies before swallowing
them. While the LPA was designed as a self-reliant development initiative
to delink Africa from Western neo-liberalism, its architects assumed that
Western governments and their FIs would finance such an indigenous
development initiative. The Western governments were not prepared to
accept such a self-contradictory policy of self-reliance and dependency;
neither were the IFIs prepared to do business with Africa using Africa’s
development blueprint. Expectedly, the World Bank released its alternative
development framework for Africa a year after the LPA was adopted.118 The
Report, written by the so-called ‘African Strategic Group’, blamed Africa’s
economic weaknesses on domestic policy inadequacies and administrative
constraints. Before recommending ‘adjustments in policy,’ the Bank argued
that a reordering of priorities is essential to accelerate economic growth in
Africa,119 which was partially correct. The Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs) that followed were rooted in neoliberal ideology, with flawed
distributional analysis and poor sequencing of reforms.120 The IFIs blithely
exhorted states to liberalize their markets and eliminate distortions in prices,
privatize public utilities, and devalue their currencies. They compelled them
to dismantle industrial protection measures, remove government subsidies,
and reduce budget deficits and size of the public sector.121 The IFIs made the
implementation of such policies a pre-condition for debt re-scheduling, new
loan facilities, and other concessions.
The legacy of the neo-liberal prescriptions of the IFIs vary from success
in the ‘East Asian Miracles’ to failure in Africa. Yew asserts that South-East
nations achieved faster growth by opening up their economies to trade and
foreign investments, adding: “Their economic dynamism made them
attractive as economic and political partners.”122 But the fact that others have
had a mild or even no toothaches after a dental surgery does not make mine

117. See generally RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: THE ORIGINS AND THE
PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1969) (discussing the making of international
economic policy and the growing global economic influence of international financial institutions (IFIs)).
118. See generally ELLIOT BERG, WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (1981) (describing the World Bank’s response of building upon the
Lagos Plan to recognize Africa’s growth opportunities).
119. Id.
120. See Paul Collier & Jan Willem Gunning, The IMF’s Role in Structural Adjustment, 109 ECON.
J. 634, 634 (1999).
121. See RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 1 (1999).
122. See, e.g., LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST: THE SINGAPORE STORY: 1965–2000
340 (2000).
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less painful. The SAPs were a colossal failure in Africa, because they
promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions without
adequate attention to social services. By failing to take countries’ specific
needs into consideration, and by prescribing the same medication for
different ailments, the World and IMF wrecked hitherto healthy economies
in Africa.123 The SAPs led to Africa’s lost decades of the 1980s and 90s.124
It contributed to massive indebtedness, which was about $141 billion at the
end of 1987, including arrears of payments due.125 The NEPAD notes that
only a few states managed to achieve a semblance of economic growth
during the period.126 The SAPs turned out to be bitter herbs of poverty for
the citizens, the majority of whom were already working for the equivalent
of slave labor wages.127 Even Ghana, which the IMF often projects as a
showpiece of SAPs in Africa, retrenched about 10,500 civil servants in 1987,
100,000 in 1988, and 12,000 in 1989.128 In some countries, retrenched
workers suffered long-lived and deep losses of income.129
Chile’s reform experience in South America falls in-between the EastAsian and African experiences, though its economic prescriptions came from
the ‘Chicago Boys’ rather than the IFIs.130 Some University of Chicago
trained economists convinced the then Chiliean dictator Augusto Pinochet to
apply free-market policies and open up the country’s economy.131 He agreed,

123. Cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN
PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 2 (2007) (detailing how industrialized countries have leveraged unequal
bargaining power to force agreements that disadvatange developing countries); see also Kombo, supra
note 49 (noting that SAPs weakened Africa’s public sector, ravaged social services, and increased
inequality).
124. See generally LIMITS OF ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION, 1986–94 (Poul Engberg-Pedersen et al. eds., 1996) (concluding Africa’s economy has
contracted in per capita growth with an additional deterioration in the position of certain economic groups,
especially women).
125. See Douglas Rimmer, External Debt and Structural Adjustment in Tropical Africa, 89 AFR.
AFF. 283, 283 (1990) (citing PERCY S. MISTRY, AFRICAN DEBT: THE CASE FOR RELIEF FOR SUBSAHARAN AFRICA (1988)).
126. NEPAD FD, supra note 51, para. 24.
127. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 293, 313–14 (2002).
128. INT’L LABOR ORG. (ILO), FROM REDEPLOYMENT TO SUSTAINED EMPLOYMENT GENERATION:
CHALLENGES FOR GHANA’S PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT 35 (1989).
129. See, e.g., NEIL MCCULLOCH ET AL., TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND POVERTY: A HANDBOOK
147 (2001) (showing that the average unemployment duration of public-sector workers laid off in Guinea
between 1985 and 1988 exceeded two years and that thirty percent were still unemployed in 1992).
130. See generally JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS, PINOCHET’S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS IN CHILE (2008) (illustrating the unique situation of a military coup implementing a free
market strategy in a developing state).
131. See Anthony Boadle, Explainer: Chile’s ‘Chicago Boys,’ a Model for Brazil Now?, REUTERS
(Jan.
4,
2019,
12:52
PM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-chicagoboys-
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and proceeded to abolish price controls, liberalize imports, and deregulate
the financial market. The policies facilitated the inflow of foreign capital and
initially jump-started the Chilean economy in the late 1970s. The oil-related
economic crises of the early 1980s threw Chile into acute recession.132
Pinochet later replaced the ‘Chicago Boys’ with economists inclined towards
state intervention and protectionism.133
The lesson from Africa’s tragic experience with SAPs is that a general
framework for development must always take into account the specific
circumstances facing different countries and regions at different times.
Market reforms alone cannot guarantee economic growth particularly in
countries that are trapped by extreme poverty, illiteracy, massive debt
overhang, AIDS, malaria and droughts.134 Privatization without regulation
leads to consumer exploitation.135 Privatization without the necessary
institutional infrastructure leads to asset stripping rather than wealth
creation. Belatedly, the World Bank now argues that more attention should
be paid to “the need for differentiated policy recommendations for countries
at different stages of development. Differences between countries . . . lead to
the need for different implications regarding the appropriate institutions and
policy frameworks.”136 It continued: “Greater emphasis on development
strategy must be balanced against the now well-understood fact that there is
no ‘one-size fits all’ solution to the challenges of promoting growth and
overcoming poverty.”137 This shift in thinking came more than two decades
after irreparable damage had been done to Africa’s economies.
The negative effects of the neo-liberal policies live on in Africa. The
situation is compounded by the impotence of many African states which
appear to be indissolubly stuck with Western governments in the face of

explainer/explainer-chiles-chicago-boys-a-model-for-brazil-now-idUKKCN1OY1OU (detailing how
University of Chicago trained economists were able to enact sweeping free market reforms in Chile).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR LIFETIME 195
(2005) (“[F]ree trade zones would not suffice, nor would they relieve extreme poverty on any kind of
realistic timetable.”).
135. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 220 (2003) (explaining how
international organizations started accept the idea that a one size fits all approach to economic
development is ineffective).
136. Alan Gelb et al., Research for Development: A World Bank Perspective on Further Directions
for Research 10 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5437, 2010),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228257638_Research_for_Development_A_World_Bank_Per
spective_on_Future_Directions_for_Research.
137. Id. at 11.
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destructive globalization.138 In Agenda 2063, the AU pledged to use the
lessons from past and present development efforts and challenges to forge
an African-centered approach to transformation.139 Going forward, the AU
must urge its members not to abandon the driving seat of their economies to
‘Development 1.0’ theorists who focus only on free market ideas. Africa’s
march into the world economy does not follow a straight line.140 Wine can
vary with every valley and vineyard.
C. The African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty
The establishment of an AEC has been a central goal in Africa’s
economic development vision. Although the LPA was not legally binding, it
provided the framework for the AEC Treaty adopted a decade later. The
Treaty establishes the AEC,141 or Community,142 to provide an institutional
framework for economic integration in Africa. Economic integration and
sustainable development run through the Monrovia Declaration, the LPA,
and the AEC Treaty. The Treaty references these earlier instruments.143 State
Parties also note efforts made in sub-regional sectoral economic cooperation,
which justified a larger and fuller integration.144 In other words, the AEC
seeks to harvest at the macro level the seeds sown at the micro levels of RECs
in order to foster harmonious economic activity among participating
members, advance higher living standards for citizens, and enhance peaceful
relations among states.145
This section briefly interrogates the AEC Treaty, which remains the
foundational document for Africa’s economic integration agenda. The first
segment examines the objectives of the AEC, the second examines the
institutional modalities for its establishment, while the third examines the
convoluted relationship between the OAU and the AEC that partly hampered
progress towards integration.
138. See generally GILES BOLTON, AFRICA DOESN’T MATTER: HOW THE WEST HAS FAILED THE
POOREST CONTINENT AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2008) (demonstrating how Western aid is
ineffective in promoting Africa’s economic development).
139. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 3.
140. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Social Rights Are Human Rights: Actualizing the Rights to Work
and Social Security in Africa, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 181, 215 (2006) [hereinafter Udombana, Social
Rights Are Human Rights] (noting how various African reform movements have had varying levels of
success).
141. See AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2 (cementing the establishment of an African economic
bloc).
142. The Treaty defines the word ‘Community’ as “the organic structure for economic integration.”
Id. art. 1. In this paper, the term ‘AEC,’ ‘CFTA’ and ‘Community’ are used interchangeably.
143. Id. pmbl.
144. Id.
145. Id. arts. 3(d), 4.
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1. The AEC Objectives and Principles
Like the LPA before it, the AEC Treaty emphasizes solidarity and
collective self-reliance.146 It seeks to integrate African economies for an
indigenous and self-sustained development.147 It also seeks to promote
cooperation in all fields and to coordinate and harmonize policies among
existing RECs in order to foster the gradual establishment of the AEC.148 To
achieve these goals, member states commit to harmonize their national
policies to promote Community activities— “particularly in the fields of
agriculture, industry, transport and communications, energy, natural
resources, trade, money and finance, human resources, education, culture,
science and technology.”149 They further commit themselves to adopt a
common trade policy vis-à-vis third states, establish and maintain a common
external tariff, and establish a common market. They commit themselves to
“the gradual removal, among [members], of obstacles to the free movement
of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and
establishment.”150
The AEC Treaty affirms some free-market principles such as trade
liberalization. It seeks to abolish customs duties levied on imports and
exports by participating states as well as non-tariff barriers, in order to
establish a free trade area in each REC.151 The next part will examine these
free-market principles in the context of the AfCFTA Agreement.
2. Modalities for Establishing the AEC
The AEC Treaty sets up detailed modalities for establishing the AEC
through six stages, each consisting of activities to be concurrently
implemented.152 State Parties envisage that the AEC will provide a rallying
point for the activities of RECs. Pursuant to the Treaty, the Community is to
be established through the co-ordination, harmonization and progressive
integration of the activities of RECs.153 This arrangement implies that
progress by an REC is progress towards the AEC.154 I now proceed to discuss
each stage and its central focus. The first stage, lasting five years, was meant
to strengthen existing RECs and establish new ones in regions where none

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. art. 3(b).
Id. art. 4(1).
Id.
Id. art. 4(2)(e).
Id. art. 4(2)(i).
Id. art. 4(2)(d).
See id. arts. 6, 88 (elaborting upon the different stages of establishing the AEC).
Id. art. 88(1).
For more on RECs, see infra Part IV.
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existed.155 The Treaty structured the second stage more or less as a
preferential trade agreement. This involved, at the level of each REC,
stabilizing tariff and ‘non-tariff barriers,156 customs duties,157 and internal
taxes. It involved determining the timetable for the gradual liberalization of
regional and intra-community trade and harmonizing customs duties vis-àvis third states. It also involved strengthening sectoral integration,
particularly in the fields of trade, agriculture, money and finance, transport
and communications, industry and energy, and coordinating and
harmonizing the activities of RECs.158
The third stage, lasting ten years, involved the establishment of a free
trade agreement and a customs union at the level of each REC.159 At the end
of this stage, no member should levy customs duties on goods originating in
one member state and imported into another; same for goods originating
from third states that are in circulation in member states but imported from
one member to another.160 The fourth stage, lasting within a period not
exceeding two years,161 involved coordinating and harmonizing tariff and
non-tariff barriers among the various RECs to ultimately establish a
continental customs union (CCU).162 The establishment of an African
Common Market (ACM) was planned to occur within a four-year period
from the end of the fourth stage.163 This is the fifth stage. The final stage,
lasting five years, entails consolidation and strengthening of ACM
structures, including implementation of obligations on free movement of
persons and factors of production. It also envisages the establishment of a
single domestic market, a Pan African Economic and Monetary Union
(PAEM), an African Central Bank (ACB) and currency, and a Pan African
Parliament (PAP).164

155. See AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 6(2)(a) (“Strengthening of existing regional economic
communities and . . . establishing economic communities in regions where they do not exist . . . .”).
156. Defined as “barriers which hamper trade and which are caused by obstacles other than fiscal
obstacles.” Id. art. 1(s).
157. Defined as “protective customs duties and charges having equivalent effect, levied on goods
for their importation.” Id. art. 1(p).
158. See id. arts. 6(2)(b), 30(1).
159. See id. art. 6(2)(c).
160. Id. art. 33(1).
161. Id. art. 6(2)(d).
162. See id. art. 6(2)(d); see also id. art. 32(2) (“During the fourth stage, regional economic
communities shall, in accordance with a programme drawn up by them, eliminate differences between
their respective external customs tariffs.”).
163. See id. art. 6(2)(e).
164. See id. art. 6(2)(f). A PAP had since been established by the AU, with its seat in South Africa.
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The implementation of the stages was to be concurrent across the states,
although the stages followed each other consecutively.165 This arrangement
was meant to ensure that activities across each stage do not overlap.
However, the AEC Treaty stipulated that the transition from one stage to
another was subject to the confirmation and approval by the AEC Assembly.
The Assembly needed to satisfy itself that the specific objectives for each
stage was implemented and all commitments fulfilled.166 There was no
definite timeline. The AEC Treaty accounted for delays.167 Like the LPA, it
dealt with each sectoral issue in some detail, most of them requiring the
adoption of specific legislative and other measures for their realization.
These sectoral issues are broad: food and agriculture, industry, science and
technology, energy and natural resources, environment, transport,
communication, and tourism, education, training, and culture, and human
resources, social affairs, health, and population.168
3. A Convoluted Relationship between the AEC and the OAU
The lack of clarity in the institutional relationship between the AEC and
the OAU might have contributed to Africa’s failure to move the AEC project
forward. There were discussions on the complex institutional relationships
during the processes leading to the adoption of the AEC Treaty.169 In the end,
states established the AEC as “an integral part” of the OAU;170 likewise the
AEC Treaty and its protocols.171 The Treaty even provided that the
headquarters of the AEC “shall be one and the same as that of the OAU,”172
a needless tautology. These provisions meant that architects of the AEC did
not want it to exist as an independent body. Given this convoluted
institutional design, the AEC became whatever the OAU members wanted it
to be. It also explains why the AEC Treaty was silent on the international
personality of the AEC. The Treaty empowered the OAU Secretary-General,
acting in his capacity as the Community’s legal representative, to undertake
certain actions: enter into contracts, be a party to judicial and other legal
proceedings, acquire and dispose movable and immovable property, borrow,

165. Id. art. 6(3).
166. Id. art. 6(4).
167. See id. art. 6(5).
168. See generally id. arts. 46–76 (addressing how African member states act and cooperate in these
sectoral areas).
169. Jeggan Senghor, The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community: An Introductory
Essay, 1 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 183, 183–85 (1993).
170. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 98(1).
171. Id. art. 99.
172. Id. art. 96.
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and accept donations, bequests and gifts.173 But the capacity of the OAU
Secretary-General to serve as legal representative of the AEC presupposes
the existence of a legal entity to be represented. I therefore submit that the
AEC possesses an international personality, notwithstanding anything to the
contrary. This conclusion is fortified by a provision in the AEC Treaty
permitting the Community to conclude co-operation agreements with third
states and to establish relations of co-operation with other international
organizations “[i]n the pursuit of its objectives.”174
D. The AU Act Preserves the AEC Treaty
The AU Act repeals the OAU Charter but preserves the AEC Treaty.175
Clearly, states saw the challenge of economic integration as requiring a
longer time horizon than the decolonization struggle which, in winding down
the OAU, they effectively declared to have been accomplished.176 In the AU
Act, they promise to accelerate the process of implementing the AEC Treaty
in order to promote Africa’s socio-economic development and face more
effectively the challenges of globalization.177 Many of the objectives and
principles in the AU Act reflect those in the AEC Treaty. These include
accelerating Africa’s political and economic integration,178 promoting
sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels,179 and
coordinating and harmonizing policies of the various RECs to gradually
attain economic integration.180 This section examines some of the strides
towards keeping the integration vision alive. It also notes the still ill-defined
relationship between the AU and AEC.
1. Strides Toward Integration
The AU has put the rhetoric of economic integration on the front burner
since its inauguration. Its policy organs have adopted legally binding
instruments and made some important decisions towards advancing the AEC
goals. At its inauguration in 2002, the AU Assembly reiterated that the LPA
of 1980 “continue to be the blue print for Africa’s integration and

173. Id. arts. 98(2)–(3).
174. Id. arts. 92(1)–(2); cf. id. art. 89 (declaring that the AEC shall cooperate with African
continental organizations and may conclude cooperation agreements with them).
175. See AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 33(1)–(2).
176. See UDOMBANA, THE AFRICAN UNION, supra note 15, at 51.
177. AU Act, supra note 14, pmbl.
178. Id. art. 3(c).
179. Id. art. 3(j).
180. Id. art. 3(l).
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development.”181 In 2004, the Assembly accepted, in principle, the AU
Vision and Mission of the AU and the Strategic Plan of its Commission
(AUC). It believed that these policy thrusts are consistent with those
identified within the framework of the process initiated in Sirte and in the
formulation of the NEPAD Programme for the integration of Africa.182 The
Assembly further institutionalized the Conference of Ministers for
Integration in 2006, pending rationalization of the Specialized and Technical
Committees (STCs).183 In a related decision, the Assembly urged RECs to
coordinate and harmonize their policies among themselves and with the
AUC in order to accelerate Africa’s integration process.184
The Assembly made a historic decision at that 2012 Summit, “to devote,
in line with conditions to be determined by the [AUC], one of its ordinary
sessions to considering development and integration issues.”185 It adopted
the first Plan of Action of the Minimum Integration Program186 and urged
members to speed up the process through concrete actions. First, they should
empower regional and continental organizations in specific areas in which
consensus has been reached.187 Second, they should initiate actions aimed at
promoting free mobility.188 Third, they should speed up the ratification and
effective implementation of relevant legal instruments. The document also

181. The Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organization of African Unity on the Occasion of the
Launching of the African Union, para. 4, Assembly of the African Union, First Ordinary Session,
ASS/AU/Decl.2(I) (July 9, 2002) [hereinafter Durban Declaration], https://au.int/sites/default/
files/decisions/9564-assembly_au_dec_1-5_i_e.pdf.
182. Decision on the Vision and Mission of the African Union and Strategic Plan, Programme and
Budget of the Commission, para. 1, Assembly of the African Union, Third Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.33(III)Rev.1 (July 6, 2004), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9550assembly_en_30_31_january_2005_auc_third_ordinary_session.pdf.
183. Decision on the Institutionalization of the Conference of African Ministers in Charge of
Integration, para. 3, Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.113(VII)
(July
1,
2006),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9555assembly_au_dec_111-133_vii_e.pdf.
184. Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
para. 2, Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.112(VII) (July 1,
2006), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9555-assembly_au_dec_111-133_vii_e.pdf; cf. Decision
on “Integration as a Factor for African Renaissance,” para. 5, Assembly of the Union, Eighteenth
Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.404(XVIII) (Jan. 29, 2012), https://au.int/sites/default/files/
decisions/9649-assembly_au_dec_391_-_415_xviii_e.pdf (inviting states to join hands to map out more
resilient regional and continental integration policies).
185. Decision on African Integration, para. 2, Assembly of the Union, Eighteenth Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.392(XVIII) (Jan. 29, 2012), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9649-assembly
_au_dec_391_-_415_xviii_e.pdf.
186. Id. para. 3.
187. Id. para. 4.
188. Id.
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emphasized the need for intra-Africa partnerships.189 The agenda items of
the Assembly summits do not show fidelity to the decision to dedicate one
of its summits solely to economic integration issues. The agenda items of its
bi-annual summits make this clear, which is to be expected in a continent
where any similitude of a stable essence is constantly under threat.
Nonetheless, the AU has made integration one of its priority agendas.
Agenda 2063 proclaims that “[t]he political unity of Africa will be the
culmination of the integration process, which includes the free movement of
people and the establishment of continental institutions, leading to full
economic integration.”190 In 2019, the Assembly urged all RECs to align
their programs and action plans with the continental agenda, including the
AEC Treaty, Agenda 2063 and its ten-year implementation plan.191
2. Still an Ill-defined Relationship
Like the OAU Charter before it, the AU Act still has not satisfactorily
addressed the complex relationship between the AU and the AEC.192 The AU
Act merely provides that upon its entry into force, the OAU/AEC shall
undertake the necessary measures to devolve its assets and liabilities to the
AU and all matters relating to it.193 In effect, the AU has absorbed the
institutional structures of the AEC that existed prior to the adoption of the
AU Act.194 Since the AU replaces the OAU and the AU Act creates organs
similar to those created under the AEC Treaty, it must be assumed—because
it is not expressly stated—that those AEC organs have been equally
subsumed in the AU’s. The vagueness in institutional relationship is a
potential source of conflict between the AU Act and the AEC Treaty. A
conflict arises where, in a particular case, the provisions of an earlier treaty
are incompatible with a later treaty on the same subject, in that they cannot

189. Id.
190. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 23.
191. Niamey Declaration of the First Mid-Year Coordination Meeting Between the AU and Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) on the Pursuit of the African Integration Agenda, para. 8,
MYCM/Decl.1(I) (July 8, 2019) [hereinafter Niamey Declaration], https://au.int/sites/default/
files/decisions/37635-mycm_decl_1_i_e.pdf.
192. See Richard Frimpong Oppong, The African Union, the African Economic Community and
Africa’s Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 92,
102–03 (2010) (noting how there are currently no principles of coordination outlined between the AU
and the AEC).
193. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 33(1).
194. See AEC Treaty, supra note 12, arts. 7(1)–(2) (explaining that the AEC Treaty established
seven organs: the Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the PAP, the Economic and Social Commission,
the Court of Justice, the General Secretariat, and the Specialized Technical Committees; and that these
organs were empowered to “perform their duties and act within the limits of the powers conferred on
them by [the] . . . Treaty”).
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be applied simultaneously.195 One of the principles for resolving such
conflicts is the rule lex posterior derogat legi priori, meaning that a later
treaty supersedes an earlier one.196 Architects of the AU Act probably
envisage such a conflict, hence the subordination of the AEC Treaty to the
Act.197 This means that, in the event of a conflict between the two
instruments, the AU Act will prevail.
E. So Far, Not Far
The potential benefits of economic integration has been welldocumented, as the first segment of this paper examined. The LPA and AEC
Treaty also manifested initial commitments towards finding Africa’s
solutions to Africa’s problems. The question that begs for an answer is why
these benefits have eluded Africa, given decades of integration efforts. The
answer is that Africa’s idea of integration has been shadowy, blighted by the
complex institutional setting under which regional integration schemes have
been operating.198 The eleven years between the LPA and the AEC Treaty
dampened the initial enthusiasm to establish an AEC.199 By the time the AEC
Treaty was adopted, new RECs had been established, with overlapping
mandates. This thwarted the initial plan of the OAU to work with only five
RECs.200 There has been a near absence of robust institutions to drive
integration in Africa. States have been more cautious than courageous with
different understandings of their roles in regional institution building. Many
do not willingly embrace the integration idea. They have failed to
subordinate immediate national political interests to long-term regional
economic goals.201 They generally would rather retreat to their sovereign
bunkers than to submit their economies to supranational oversights for the
common good. They prefer a hit-and-run approach rather than adopting
concrete and sustained action to implement timelines. Their vagueness and
indecision explains the absence of unanimity over the meaning, timing, and
sequencing of integration.202

195. See MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 402 (2009).
196. See VCLT, supra note 30, art. 30, para. 3.
197. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 33, para. 2.
198. Alpha Oumar Konaré & Abdoulie Janneh, Foreword to U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR.,
ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA II: RATIONALIZING REGIONAL ECONOMIC
COMMUNITIES, at xiii, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.K.2 (2006).
199. Karangizi, supra note 9, at 234.
200. Id.
201. See Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony?, supra note 64, at 202 (critiquing Africa’s failed
experiment on economic integration).
202. See Karangizi, supra note 9, at 234.
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Africa’s economy remains fragmented. Intra-African trade is low.
Trade finance, where it exists, is inadequate. Human capital development is
poor. Violent conflicts, vested interests of powerful national governments
and other important actors, corruption, and the complexity arising from
multiple RECs with overlapping membership and mandate repeatedly derail
the AEC vision. Poor infrastructure still hampers Africa’s trade and
development. Where intra-African railway networks, roads, shipping lines,
sea and air transport, and ICT facilities exist, they are either inadequate or
problematic or both. Driving on many African roads is neither easy nor
cheap, as uniformed armed robbers, called Police, often threaten travelers at
checkpoints to extract tributes. It is more competitive to be a trader in Asia,
with its efficient infrastructure and customs bureaucracies, than in Africa.203
The World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking of 190 countries for 2018,
benchmarked to June 2017, has no African state among the first top
twenty.204
Market access is one of the simplest levels of integration, but high
tariffs and non-tariff barriers continue to hamper intra-African trade. Several
countries rank on the bottom of the ease of doing business index, meaning
that the regulatory environment is less conducive to the starting and
operation of a local firm. The World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking
for 2018 has no African state among the top twenty.205 Almost all the
countries at the bottom are from Africa.206 South Africa and Nigeria, two of
Africa’s leading economies, are ranked at 82 and 145, respectively.207
Several of these countries are also on the bottom of the World Bank’s
ranking on ease of registering properties.208 An impenetrable jungle of rules,
coupled with overflowing enactments, inefficiency of public administration,
and lack of an ethical commitment in the public service evince uncertainties
and absence of transparency. Such legal black holes force economic actors
to do business in the shadow of legality.209 This is Africa’s bane, where some
antediluvian regulations and unnecessary bureaucracies frustrate business,

203. BOLTON, supra note 138, at 237.
204. See Ease of Doing Business Rankings, WORLD BANK, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
(last visited Oct. 7, 2020).
205. See id. (showing that the closest to the top of the league is Mauritius, ranked 25, followed by
Rwanda, ranked 41).
206. See id. (including Somalia at 190, Eritrea at 189, South Sudan at 187, Libya at 185, CAR at
184, DRC at 182, Chad at 180, Congo at 179, and Guinea-Bissau at 176).
207. See id.
208. See id. (including Nigeria at 179, Zambia at 149, Kenya at 125, Ghana at 119, Swaziland at
115, Lesotho at 109, and South Africa at 107, to sample a few).
209. See HERDEGEN, supra note 81, at 165 (referencing HERNANDO DE SOTO, EL OTRO SENDERO:
LA REVOLUCIÓN INFORMAL (1986)).
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elicit corruption, and stymie economic growth. Africa largely operates a
black market economy, coupled with a ruling-class interest and a culture of
patronage that sees inequality as the natural order of things.
For decades, Africa collectively pledged to remove barriers to the free
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital.210 But insularity remains
the guiding principle in many states. South Africa’s immigration policy is a
containment strategy rather than a path to economic growth. In an era in
which borders are coming down in order to encourage mobility and facilitate
trade, South Africa is introducing layers of red tape to the process of moving
in and out of the country.211 Its Immigration Act, which regulates foreigners’
right to admission to, residence in, and departure from South Africa,212 is an
architecture of exclusion. Most South Africans do not view their country as
part of Africa; for them, the continent is a place that begins beyond the
country’s borders. The xenophobic-induced attacks against other African
nationals illustrate South Africa’s ‘we’ versus ‘them’ bunker mentality.213
The challenges that collective Africa identified in the Monrovia
Declaration of 1979, which prompted the adoption of the LPA in 1980, the
AEC Treaty in 1991, and the AU Act in 2000, remain several decades later.
These are market fragmentation, smallness of national economies, narrow
export base caused by shallow manufacturing capacity, and over-reliance on
the export of primary commodities. Others are lack of export specialization,
under-developed industrial bases for increased value chains, and high
regulatory and tariff barriers.214 Instability and poor macro-economic
management still define Africa’s landscape.215 They hobble the quest for

210. See, e.g., Decision on African Economic Community, para. 5, Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session, AHG/OAU/AEC/Dec.1(II) (June 8, 1998),
https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/489/1998%20AHG%20Dec%20124-131%20%28X
XXIV%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
211. Sisonke Msimang, Belonging—Why South Africans Refuse to Let Africa in, AFR. IS A COUNTRY
(Apr. 15, 2014), https://africasacountry.com/2014/04/belonging-why-south-africans-refuse-to-let-africa.
212. See generally Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (S. Afr.) (repealing the Aliens Control Act 99 of
1991 (S. Afr.) which was a pillar of the apartheid era).
213. See, e.g., South Africa: How Common Are Xenophobic Attacks?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47800718 (reporting on attacks across South Africa since 1994,
as monitored by the African Centre for Migration & Society).
214. Wamkele Keabetswe Mene, Secretary-General H.E., Address at the Official Commissioning
and Handing Over of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (Aug. 17, 2020) [hereinafter
Statement by Mene].
215. See, e.g., Decision on the Fourth Report of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
on the Implementation of the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns
in Africa by the Year 2020, para. 5, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-Second Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.719(XXXII) (Feb. 10, 2019), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf (lamenting persistence of threats to peace and security in
Africa).
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sustainable economic and human capacity development in many countries.
The maiden indigenous Africa Governance Report,216 which the AU
Assembly commissioned in 2017217 and formally considered in 2019,218
declares that governance has generally improved in Africa, though it
acknowledges “least gains . . . in democracy and political governance.”219
That report is an augmented reality that is widely detached from the actual.
The truth is that Africa’s political culture is still “lacking in discernible and
widely acclaimable paradigm that can be publicly perceived as organizing
and directing a system of socio-cultural dependencies that inhabit social
consciousness and is significant to social change and national
development.”220 The AU also regards democratic practices, good
governance, the rule of law, human rights protection, and respect for the
sanctity of human life as shared values.221 Corruption among Africa’s
political leaders also appears to be a shared value. Many of the leaders,
whether in the executive or legislative branch—for those countries
pretending to be democratic, not to mention authoritarian states—are pirates
in power. They treat their countries as prostrate victims to be ravished in
pursuit of vainglory.222 The names of persons who demonstrate excellence
in leadership and live above board could fit into the back of a postage stamp.
The last person who won the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African

216. See generally AFR. PEER REVIEW MECHANISM, AFRICA GOVERNANCE REPORT: PROMOTING
AFRICAN UNION SHARED VALUES (2019) [hereinafter AFRICA GOVERNANCE REPORT 2019]
(highlighting trends in governance, instability, and development on the continent).
217. Decision on the Revitalisation of the African Peer Review Mechanism, Assembly of the Union,
Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.631(XXVIII) (Jan. 30, 2017), https://au.int/sites/
default/files/decisions/32520-sc19553_e_original_-_assembly_decisions_621-641_-_xxviii.pdf.
218. Decision on the State of Governance in Africa, para. 5, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-Second
Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.720(XXXII) (Feb. 10, 2019), https://au.int/sites/default/files/
decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf.
219. AFRICA GOVERNANCE REPORT 2019, supra note 216, para. 8.
220. O.B. Lawuyi, Can this Individual Be Wrong? Reflections on Contemporary African Political
Culture, in EXPLORING THE ETHICS OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM 55 (Enoch Olujide
Gbadegesin et al. eds., 2016).
221. Declaration on the Theme of the Summit: Towards Greater Unity and Integration Through
Shared Values, pmbl., Assembly of the Union, Sixteenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVI)
(Jan.
30,
2011)
[hereinafter
Declaration
on
Shared
Values],
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9645-assembly_en_30_31_january_2011_auc_assembly_
africa.pdf.
222. See generally A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: WEALTH,
POWER, RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY (Sunday Bobai Agang et al. eds., 2019) (demonstrating how anticorruption efforts are key to the development of African states); JIMANZE EGO-ALOWES, CORRUPTION IN
AFRICA: RESOLUTION THROUGH NEW DIAGNOSIS (2014) (noting the correlation between ignorance and
corruption on the African continent); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa’s
Anti-corruption Convention, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 447 (2003) (providing an overview of the
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption).
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Leadership223 was former President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, in
2017.224 Before her was former President Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia,
in 2014.225 The Prize Committee could not find a fit and proper candidate for
the award in years 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2016, 2018, and 2019.226
The systemic corruption in Africa has forced many citizens to resign to
Nietzsche’s nihilism—the philosophy of despair.227 The evidence is the
endless immigration crisis, where “[t]ens of thousands of young African
bodies have been swallowed by the sea or abandoned in the desert, in pursuit
of a decent life for which they are prepared to risk everything, because they
believe there is no hope at home. They testify to the urgent need to act.”228
Collective Africa has acknowledged “the need for radical transformation at
all levels and in all spheres” in order to accelerate development and meet the
aspirations of citizens.229 But chronic remorse is also an undesirable thing.
There are mistakes which humanity has made and repented of so often that
there is no excuse for repeating them. Besides, Africa can no longer afford
an endless economic experiment. It is against this background of reiterated
failure and incessant peril that I now examine the AfCFTA Agreement,
adopted to reboot Africa’s integration agenda and advance sustainable
development.
III. TOWARDS A NEW DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: THE AFCFTA
AGREEMENT
The AfCFTA Agreement of 2018 established the Continental Free
Trade Area (CFTA) to provide the institutional framework for a code of
conduct that reduces tariffs and other barriers to trade and eliminates
discrimination in trade relations among states.230 It is the latest intervention
in a legal conversation that began in 1980 with the adoption of the LPA,
extending through 1991 with the adoption of the AEC Treaty, and 2000 with
the adoption of the AU Act—a long trek in the quest for sustainable

223. Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, MO IBRAHIM FOUND.,
https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (1901) (arguing that there is no
objective order in the universe except what we give it).
228. H.E. Paul Kagame, The Imperative to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed
Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, at 4, AFRICAN UNION [AU] (2017)
[hereinafter Kagame Report], https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34915-file-report-20institutional20
reform20of20the20au-2.pdf.
229. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 66(b).
230. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 2.
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development. The AfCFTA Agreement advances “the Pan African Vision of
‘[a]n integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa’ enshrined in Agenda
2063.”231 Its State Parties hope to have the African Common Market (ACM)
in place by 2023, five years earlier than the target deadline set in the AEC
Treaty.232
The AfCFTA Agreement builds on the respective rights and obligations
of states under the AEC Treaty, the AU Act, and, where applicable, the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.233 This preambular provision
clearly indicates that the CFTA is not a new institutional architecture. It
renovates, reinforces, and refines the structures erected in the LPA and the
AEC Treaty.234 Its reference to the Marrakesh Agreement also suggests that
members may take the WTO acquis into consideration in their trading rights
and obligations, provided taking the acquis into consideration does not
defeat the overarching objective of the CFTA.235 To enhance transparency,
the AfCFTA Agreement mandates each of its state parties to promptly and
publicly publish its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings
of general application, and any other commitments under an international
agreement relating to any trade matter covered by the Agreement.236 The AU
Assembly also stated recently that members wishing to enter into economic
partnerships with third parties should inform the Assembly and assure that
those partnerships will not undermine the AU Vision of creating one African
market.237
231. Id. art. 3(a) (emphasis added).
232. Issoufou Mahamadou, Report on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA),
Assembly of the African Union, Thirty-Second Ordinary Session, Ext/Assembly/AU/2(XII) (Feb. 10,
2019),
https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/6542/Assembly%20AU%204%20%28
XXXII%29%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
233. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, pmbl. (emphasis in the original).
234. This context probably explains why the AfCFTA is not fitted with a separate legal personality
though, as will be shown later, one of its organs is expressly conferred with personality.
235. Cf. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, pmbl. (stating the desire to establish the African Continental
Free Trade Area while also building on rights and obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement if
applicable.); AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 93(1) (permitting Member States to conclude agreements
with other parties to the extent such agreements are not incompatible with the provisions of the AEC
Treaty).
236. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 16(1); cf. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 93(1) (requiring
Members States to transmit agreements they conclude to the Secretary-General); Protocol on Trade in
Services, supra note 24, art. 5 (requiring each State Party to promptly publish any measures pertaining to
or affecting the Protocol as well as international or regional agreements affecting trade in services that
they conclude).
237. Decision on the African Continental Free Trade Area, para. 7, Assembly of the Union, ThirtySecond Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.714(XXXII) (Feb. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Decision on
AFCFTA
Feb.
2019],
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713__748_xxxii_e.pdf; cf. Decisions on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Assembly of the
Union, Thirty-First Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.692(XXXI) (July 1, 2018),
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This part examines the objectives and scope of the CFTA, its underlying
principles, and its organic structure. It is intended to reveal, inter alia, its
architects’ efforts to reconcile Afrocentric development needs with free
market principles. The AfCFTA Agreement and its protocols238 as well as
the AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and
Rights of Establishment,239 are some of the primary sources to be interpreted.
A. Purpose and Scope
The contemporary economic system is a product of complex legal and
institutional designs: international trade, commercial and corporate laws,
intellectual property (IP) laws, monetary and financial laws, rules on dispute
settlement (including conflict of laws), etcetera. Treaties—agreements in
written form by two or more states governed by international law240—
perform a variety of functions in international relations. These functions
include regulation of international trade, aviation, environment, cyberspace,
boundaries, investment protection, and shared natural resources.241 As a
regional trade instrument, the AfCFTA Agreement primarily seeks to
regulate and facilitate intra-African trade by creating a single market for
goods and services facilitated by free movement of persons, residence and
establishment. This section interrogates the purpose of the CFTA and its
scope of application.
1. Purpose of the CFTA
Every treaty is identified by its object and purpose, and the preamble
often aids an understanding of the purpose.242 Although the preamble lies
outside a treaty’s operative part and confers no contractual rights or
obligations, it provides an introductory statement about the treaty. It usually
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36130-assembly_au_dec_690_-_712_xxxi_e.pdf (compiling a
record of African initiatives and resolutions on intercontinental cooperation).
238. The Protocol on DSM Rules will be excluded from consideration as it does not have immediate
relevance to the focus of this paper.
239. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free
Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, adopted Jan. 28, 2018,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403-treaty-protocol_on_free_movement_of_persons_in_africa
_e.pdf [hereinafter AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons] (not yet in force); see also Decision on
the
Legal
Instruments,
Assembly
of
the
Union,
Thirtieth
Ordinary
Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.676(XXX) (Jan. 28, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/33908assembly_decisions_665_-_689_e.pdf (adopting the protocol establishing the African Economic
Community).
240. VCLT, supra note 30, art. 2(1)(a).
241. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (8th ed.
2012); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
173 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
242. VILLIGER, supra note 195, at 43.
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gives a preliminary explanation of the history of the instrument and the
parties’ intentions, namely, their motivations for concluding and the values
underlying the treaty. It also provides the context for the interpretation of the
treaty.243 Fitzmaurice asserts that the preamble sometimes reflects
independent rules of customary international law and, hence, they are
binding in character.244
Approaching the AfCFTA Agreement and its protocols from their
preambles reveals that the CFTA is driven by a collective aspiration for a
continental market with free mobility of persons, capital, goods, and
services. Such activities are crucial for deepening economic integration and
promoting agricultural development, food security, industrialization, and
structural economic transformation.245 The CFTA is also driven by a desire
to create an environment conducive to private sector development that could
boost intra-African trade.246 Another motivation is the drive to enhance
competitiveness at the industry and enterprise levels by exploiting
opportunities for economies of scale, continental market access, and efficient
resource allocation.247 States also desire to harness the potential and
capacities of African services suppliers, particularly at the micro, small, and
medium levels, in order to develop regional and global value chains.248 They
hope to achieve these ambitious goals by establishing “clear, transparent,
predictable and mutually-advantageous rules” to govern trade, competition
policy, investment, and IP.249 They are mindful that a comprehensive rule on
trade in goods will deepen economic efficiency and linkages and improve
social welfare. By progressively eliminating trade barriers, there will be an
increase in trade and investment with greater opportunities for economies of
scale for businesses of participating states.250 Such rules will also assist in
resolving challenges of multiple and overlapping trade regimes in order to
achieve policy coherence.251
243. See VCLT, supra note 30, art. 31(2) (explaining how the CFTA treaty should be interpretted);
Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. Comm’n H.R Dec. & Rep. 16 § 34 (1975).
244. Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951–54, 33
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 229 (1957).
245. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, pmbl. (referencing Agenda 2063).
246. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl.; Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note
24, pmbl.
247. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl.; Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note
24, pmbl.
248. Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, pmbl.
249. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, pmbl.
250. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl.; Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note
24, pmbl.
251. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl.; Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note
24, pmbl.

UDOMBANA_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/22/2021 8:47 PM

A STEP CLOSER

37

Following on these overriding motivations, the operative part of the
AfCFTA Agreement sets out some ‘General Objectives’ and ‘Specific
Objectives.’ The ‘General Objectives’ category includes creating a
liberalized market for goods and services through successive rounds of
negotiations, contributing to the movement of capital and natural persons and
facilitating investments building on the initiatives and developments in state
parties and RECs, laying the foundation for the establishment of a
Continental Customs Union (CCU) at a later stage, and promoting industrial
development through diversification and regional value chain development,
agricultural development and food security.252 The ‘Specific Objectives’
category includes cooperation on investment, IP and competition policy,
cooperation on all trade-related areas, and cooperation on customs matters
and the implementation of trade facilitation measures.253 These and other
objectives reveal the broad ends that the CFTA seeks to accomplish. Of these
objectives, industrial and agricultural development, food security, and
diversification and regional value chain are at the heart of Africa’s
development agenda. The emphasis placed on them, both in the preambular
and operative parts of the AfCFTA Agreement, validates this paper’s central
thesis that the CFTA is an Afrocentric initiative fashioned to address Africa’s
development needs.
Agricultural transformation is collective Africa’s common goal,
understandably because it is a strategic sector for economic revolution,
productivity, competitiveness, and innovation. Agriculture and food security
have been recurring agenda items in the AU Assembly summits since, at
least, 2003, as reflected in its many decisions and declarations.254
252. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3.
253. Id. art. 4.
254. See, e.g., Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, Assembly of the African
Union,
Second
Ordinary
Session,
Assembly/AU/Decl.7(II)
(July
10,
2003),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9548-assembly_en_10_12_july_2003_auc_the_second_ordinar
y_session_0.pdf; Sirte Declaration on the Challenges of Implementing Integrated and Sustainable
Development on Agriculture and Water in Africa, Assembly of the African Union, Second Extraordinary
Session, Ex/Assembly/AU/Decl.1(II) (Feb. 27, 2004), https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/
african-union/1540-au-assembly-sirte-declaration-on-the-challenges-of-implementing-integrated-andsustainable-development-in-agriculture-and-water-in-africa-february-2004/file.html; Decision on the
Special Summit of the AU on Fertilizers, Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.117(VII) (July 1, 2007), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/943/
Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20117%20%28VII%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y;
Sirte
Declaration on Investing in Agriculture for Economic Growth and Food Security, Assembly of the
African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XIII)Rev.1 (July 1, 2009),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9560-assembly_en_1_3_july_2009_auc_thirteenth_ordinary_
session_decisions_declarations_message_congratulations_motion_0.pdf; Declaration on Nutrition
Security for Inclusive Economic Growth and Sustainable Development in Africa, Assembly of the Union,
Twenty-Third
Ordinary
Session,
Assembly/AU//Decl.4(XXIII)
(June
26,
2014),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9661-assembly_au_dec_517_-_545_xxiii_e.pdf; Decision on
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Notwithstanding the several reiterations of its importance to food security
and economic growth, there has been no significant progress in attaining the
minimum targets of public investment in agriculture. Meeting such targets
will demonstrate Africa’s ownership and leadership in achieving set goals.
Limited progress in agro-industries and agribusiness development hampers
value addition and competitiveness of Africa’s products in trade locally,
regionally, and internationally.255 Africa mainly exports primary products,
which attract little foreign exchange earnings because their prices fluctuate
according to external market variables.256 In consequence, Africa has not
been able to meet the nutrition needs of its growing population, let alone
create value chains for export and sustainable economic growth.257 Hunger
exists in abundance despite Africa’s limitless natural resources, including
land, water, plant, livestock, fisheries and aquaculture, and forestry. In 2018,
the AU Assembly acknowledged that the number of those affected by hunger
and malnutrition has not decreased over the past few years, and that food
security without improved nutrition will not deliver the desired inclusive
socio-economic outcomes.258 Over 200 million people remain
undernourished in 2020.259 Since there is no vaccine for hunger, many

Fast Tracking CAADP-Malabo Commitments for Accelerating Agriculture Transformation in Africa
Through Biennial Review Mechanism and Africa Agricultural Transformation Scorecard, Assembly of
the Union, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.668(XXX) (Jan. 28, 2018),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/33908-assembly_decisions_665_-_689_e.pdf; Decision on the
Summit on Food Security in Africa, Abuja, Nigeria, Assembly of the African Union, Eighth Ordinary
Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.135(VIII) (2007), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9556-assembly_
en_29_30_january_2007_auc_the_african_union_eighth_ordinary_session.pdf; Decision on the
Continental Scorecard for Nutrition, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-Second Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.739(XXXII) (Feb. 10, 2019), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assem
bly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf.
255. See Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared
Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, pmbl., Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Third Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/ /Decl.1(XXIII) (June 26, 2014) [hereinafter Malabo Declaration], https://au.int/sites/
default/files/decisions/9661-assembly_au_dec_517_-_545_xxiii_e.pdf (discussing challenges in
reaching public investment in agriculture goals and the need to address concerns regarding population
malnurishment).
256. Cf. NEPAD FD, supra note 51, para. 156 (discussing the need to improve regulations relating
to mining activities to strengthen Africa’s exports market).
257. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Keeping the Promise: Improving Access to Socio-economic
Rights in Africa, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135, 172 (2012) [hereinafter Udombana, Keeping the
Promise] (discussing the main causes of hunger in Africa).
258. Decision on the African Leaders for Nutrition (ALN) Initiative, para. 2, Assembly of the Union,
Thirtieth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.681(XXX) (Jan. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Decision on ALN],
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/33908-assembly_decisions_665_-_689_e.pdf.
259. See DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, 2020 GLOBAL NUTRITION REPORT: ACTION ON EQUITY TO
END MALNUTRITION (2020), https://globalnutritionreport.org/documents/566/2020_Global_Nutrition_
Report_2hrssKo.pdf (revealing significant inequalities in nutrition outcomes within countries and
populations).
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governments resort to food imports to feed their populations. Part five will
explore options towards achieving food security and economic growth
through agricultural development.
Regional integration used to be seen more as isolated processes of trade
arrangements than as development strategies. With time, they have become
approaches to economic development.260 They have also grown to serve as
frameworks for developing political consensus among their members around
regional challenges, among them development, politics, and security.261 The
cross-cutting linkages between trade and development goals indicate that
African RTAs are designed as flexible regimes of cooperation rather than
rules requiring scrupulous adherence.262 This probably explains why the
AfCFTA Agreement nestles in these non-trade objectives such as sustainable
socio-economic development, gender equality, and structural transformation
of states.263 The constitutive treaties of some RECs also aspire towards
economic development and improved living standards. The Revised
ECOWAS Treaty aims to promote cooperation and integration in West
Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, maintain and
enhance economic stability, foster relations-among members, and contribute
to the progress and development of the continent as a whole.264 The ECCAS
Treaty provides that integrating the economies of its members will increase
economic self-reliance and promote endogenous and self-sustained
development.265 The SADC Treaty aims, inter alia, to promote selfsustaining development based on collective self-reliance and
interdependence of its members.266 The same focus is evident in the AU Act,
which aims at raising living standards in Africa through co-operation in all
fields of human activity.267 This yearning probably inspired the inclusion of
three financial institutions—the African Central Bank (ACB), African
Monetary Fund (AMF), and African Investment Bank (AIB)—as organs of

260. See CLAUDE AKE, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA 168 (1981) (discussing regional
integration’s impact on modern Africa’s economic foundation).
261. GATHII, supra note 115, at 24.
262. See, e.g., AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 5(d) (listing flexibility as one of its operating
principles).
263. Id. art. 3(f); cf. Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, pmbl. (stating the desire to provide
“social and welfare-enhancing opportunities” in addition to economic opportunities).
264. Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, art. 3(1), July 24, 1993,
2373 U.N.T.S. 233 (entered into force Aug. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Revised ECOWAS Treaty].
265. Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, art. 4(1)(a), adopted
Oct. 18, 1983, 23 I.L.M. 945 (entered into force Dec. 18, 1984) [hereinafter ECCAS Treaty].
266. SADC Treaty, supra note 62, art. 5(1)(d).
267. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 3(k); cf. id. art. 3(j) (noting the promotion of “economic, social and
cultural” development and “the integration of African economies” as objectives).
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the AU.268 They will certainly play critical roles towards realizing the goals
of the CFTA. The AMF, for example, will be critical in providing loans to
states to meet their balance of payment challenges.269
In sum, the CFTA seeks to significantly boost intra-Africa trade,
improve economies of scale through an integrated market, serve as a catalyst
for industrial development, place Africa on a path to exporting value-added
products, and improve Africa’s competitiveness in global trade.270 If
diligently pursued, it will enhance cooperation, commit states to reforms,
increase bargaining power, and improve human security.
2. The Scope of Application
Modern international trade regimes are rapidly extending beyond
traditional goods and services271 and focusing on IP investment, competition,
and social (labor) matters.272 Even IP ‘rights’273 used to be regulated by
municipal law but are now tradable commodities.274 The AfCFTA
Agreement covers both the traditional and contemporary subject-matters:
trade in goods, trade in services, investment, IP, and competition policy.275
Trade in goods cover lists of negotiated specific tariff concessions and
commitments by each state party. Its Protocol sets out the terms, conditions
268. See id. arts. 5(1)(i), 19.
269. African Union [AU], Statute of the African Monetary Fund, art. 2(a), adopted June 27, 2014,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36417-treaty-0046_-_protocol_on_the_establishment_of_the_afr
ican_monetary_fund_e.pdf.
270. See Statement by Mene, supra note 214.
271. The strict division between trade in goods and trade in services are sometimes, for example, in
measures involving a service relating to a particular good or a service supplied in conjunction with a
particular good. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities: Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, para. 221, WTO Doc. DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997).
272. See Marsha A. Echols, Regional Economic Integration, 31 INT’L L. 453 (1997) (discussing the
importance of considering regional economic integration when conducting analysis on laws affecting an
international transaction).
273. IP is an umbrella term for copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, and other types of
‘rights.’
274. See generally JUSTIN MALBON ET AL., THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (2014) (providing a textual analysis of the TRIPS
Agreement); WTO: TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Peter-Tobias Stoll
et al. eds., 2008) (providing a comparative analysis commentary on the TRIPS Agreement in relation to
other similar international agreements); Thomas Cottier, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, in 1 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (P.F. Macrory et al. eds., 2005) (discussing how the TRIPS Agreement evolved
from a minor agreement, focusing mainly on border enforcement issues, into a main pillar of the
multilateral trading system); CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000) (explaining the main
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the implications for developing countries in implementing the
Agreement through national legislation).
275. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 6.
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and qualifications under which goods may be imported under the CFTA.276
‘Trade in services,’ defined as the supply of service in any sector,277 includes
the production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery of a service.278 But
it does not cover services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority.279 Trade in service is based on four modes of supply of a service.280
The first is the supply of service from the territory of one state party to that
of another. The second is the supply of service in the territory of a state party
to the service consumer of any other party. The third is supply of service by
a service supplier of one state party through commercial presence in the
territory of any other party. The fourth is supply of service by a service
supplier of one state party through presence of natural persons of a state party
in the territory of any other party.281
The tradeable products under the CFTA are negotiated in phases and in
successive rounds to create a liberalized market.282 The AU Assembly
approved the modalities for negotiations in 2017, before the adoption of the
AfCFTA Agreement, with a 90 percent level of ambition.283 Phase I
negotiations cover trade in goods and trade in services, including ‘rules of
origin,’ custom’s cooperation and mutual administrative assistance, trade
facilitation, non-tariff barriers, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, transit, and trade remedies. Some of these issues
have been finalized, which led to the adoption of the two protocols under
focus. The tariff issues are annexed to the Protocol on Trade in Goods and
form its integral part.284 The AfCFTA Agreement also provides for postadoption negotiations on some outstanding issues,285 covering IP,
investment, and competition policy.286 The AU plans to adopt additional
protocols on these sectors in January 2021. It has urged the AU Ministers of
Trade to fastback negotiations on them and to submit the draft legal texts
276. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, art. 1(i).
277. Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, arts. 1(p), 2(3)(b).
278. Id. art. 1(o).
279. Id. art. 2(3)(b). The Protocol defines “a service supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority” as “any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one
or more service suppliers.” Id. art. 2(3)(c).
280. Id. art. 2(2).
281. Id. art. 1(p).
282. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(b); cf. Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, art.
18(1) (describing how the successive rounds of negotiation must proceed).
283. Decision on the Continental Free Trade Area, para. 3, Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Ninth
Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.647(XXIX) (July 3, 2017), https://au.int/sites/default/files/
decisions/37294-assembly_au_dec_642_-_664_xxix_e_1.pdf.
284. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, art. 3(2).
285. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 7(2).
286. Id. art. 7(1).
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through the Specialised Technical Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs.287 The January date appears no longer feasible for the adoption of
new protocols, in view of the challenges posed by Covid-19, a pneumonia of
unknown cause.288
June 2020 was the deadline for finalizing these negotiations under the
original plan.289 Towards achieving that target, the AU Assembly mandated
the CFTA Negotiating Institutions to conclude the outstanding work on
Phase I, including rules of origin, for submission in February 2020.290 At the
subsequent 33rd Ordinary Session in February 2020, the Assembly directed
the AUC to convene the necessary meetings to conclude work on rules of
origin, schedules of tariff concessions, and specific commitment on the five
priority service sectors.291 It also directed the CFTA Council of Ministers
and relevant AU policy organs to finalize the CFTA ‘Organizational
Structure’ together with a work program and supplementary budget.292 Based
on the recommendation of the CFTA Council, the Assembly scheduled an
Extraordinary Summit for May 30, 2020 to approve all instruments
necessary to meet the start date for trading.293 Again Covid-19 has put a hold
on the works. The pandemic has also caused major disruptions to global trade
and the movement of persons, goods, services, with potentially grave
implications on Africa’s economy.294 In April 2020, the CFTA Secretariat
announced the postponement of the CFTA trading start date.295 The revised
start date of trading is now January 1, 2021,296 which will largely depend on
287. See Decision on AfCFTA Feb. 2019, supra note 237, para. 13(ii).
288. The Covid-19 virus first broke out in Wuhan, China, in late December 2019. The World Health
Organization classified it as a pandemic in March 2020. See Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO
Dir.-Gen., Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020).
289. See id. para. 6.
290. Id. para. 13(ii).
291. Decision on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), para. 10, Assembly of the
Union, Thirty-Third Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.751(XXXIII) (Feb. 9, 2020) [hereinafter
Decision on AfCFTA Feb. 2020], https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/38180-assembly_au_dec_
749-795_xxxiii_e.pdf; see also id. para. 16.
292. Id. para. 11.
293. Id. para. 9.
294. For an in-depth summary of the general impact of COVID-19 on Africa, see generally U.N.
ECON. COMM’N AFR., POLICY BRIEF: IMPACT OF COVID-19 IN AFRICA (May 20, 2020).
295. See Dike Onwuamaeze, AfCFTA Postpones Implementation of Agreement, THIS DAY (Apr. 29,
2020, 4:31 AM), https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/04/29/afcfta-postpones-implementationof-agreement/. Citing Covid-19, the Secretary-General stated: “I think that’s the responsible thing to do.
I don’t think it would be appropriate when people are dying to be focused on meeting the 1 July deadline.
Instead all governments should be allowed to concentrate their efforts on fighting the pandemic and
saving lives at home.” Id.
296. See Chike Olisah, African Continental Free Trade’s First Commercial Deal to Take off January 1,
2021, NAIRAMETRICS (Aug. 16, 2020), https://nairametrics.com/2020/08/16/african-continental-freetrades-first-commercial-deal-to-take-off-january-1-2021.
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Africa’s ability to flatten the Covid-19 infection curve, especially as finding
a vaccine for the virus is still months away. Virtual meetings will be used to
complete the outstanding negotiations.297
Contestation is a fact of life, but so is compromise. Thus, whatever the
preferred method of negotiating the outstanding issues, the CFTA
negotiating parties should show flexibility. The parties should bear in mind
Africa’s peculiar needs. Negotiations on IP, for example, should be less rigid
than the onerous rules under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).298 The parties should balance the
need for adequate protection in the country of destination with the imperative
of technology transfer for sustainable development. IP is a social product. A
rigid patent protection could pose a serious barrier to accessing life-saving
(traditional) medicines, particularly in a continent frequently afflicted with
epidemics like HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB).299 Ultimately,
States parties thus have a duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for
access to essential medicines, plant seeds or other means of food
production, or for schoolbooks and learning materials, from undermining
the rights of large segments of the population to health, food and
education. Moreover, States parties should prevent the use of scientific
and technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights and dignity,
including the rights to life, health and privacy, e.g. by excluding inventions
from patentability whenever their commercialization would jeopardize the
full realization of these rights.300

Certain products are excluded from liberalization. These are designated
as ‘Sensitive Products and ‘Exclusive List,’ based on the following criteria:
food security, national security, fiscal revenue, livelihood and
industrialization.301 These products have fixed percentages—7 percent of
total tariff lines for ‘Sensitive Products’ and a maximum of 3 percent of total
tariff lines for ‘Exclusive List.’302 There is a proviso that products excluded
from liberalization should not represent more than 3 percent of tariff lines,

297. See Press Release, African Union Directorate of Information & Communication, In Wake of
Covid-19, African Union to Keep AfCFTA on Track with Digital Technology (Aug. 14, 2020) (on file
with author).
298. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81.
299. See generally HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2007) (explaining the conflict between human rights law and patent law in
the context of access to life-saving medication).
300. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 17, para.
3(ii), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006).
301. Decision on AFCFTA Feb. 2019, supra note 237, para. 3(ii).
302. Id. para. 4.
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and accounting for not more than 10 percent of the value of imports from
other states.303
B. Shared Values and Organizing Principles
Collective Africa recognizes democracy, human rights promotion,
gender equality, and the rule of law as instrumental values for developing
economic cooperation, including international trade.304 The preamble to the
AfCFTA Agreement embeds these libertarian and egalitarian values;305
likewise the AEC Treaty,306 the AU Act,307 Agenda 2063,308 and the AEC
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons.309 These values formed the theme of
the AU Assembly’s summit in 2011; and in the subsequent Declaration, the
AU noted “Africa’s rich tradition of solidarity, consensus, national
reconciliation and communalism and its contribution to the universal
principles of governance, democracy, and human rights.”310 The Africa
Governance Report additionally articulates unity, prosperity, peace, citizen
empowerment, and global engagement as common goals that inform
Africa’s collective decisions and actions. 311 Clearly, these shared values are
means for accelerating Africa’s integration agenda,312 but their relevance
does not have to be established through their direct or indirect contribution
to GDP growth.313 They could serve as tools for mobilizing Africans to the
ideals of Pan-Africanism.314 In the specific context of the CFTA, these
shared values could help to maintain a healthy balance between the perils of
free markets and the demands of social justice. They should therefore inform
the AU’s common position on trade, environment, security, or any other.
The operative part of the AfCFTA Agreement also incorporates liberal
economic principles, such as trade liberalization, factor mobility, the MostFavored-Nations (MFN) Treatment, transparency, flexibility, variable

303. Id.
304. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21.
305. Id.
306. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 3(g).
307. AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 3(g)–(h), 4(l)–(m).
308. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 28.
309. AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, supra note 239, pmbl.
310. See Declaration on Shared Values, supra note 221, pmbl.
311. AFRICA GOVERNANCE REPORT 2019, supra note 216, para. 2.2.
312. See Declaration on Shared Values, supra note 221, pmbl.
313. Cf. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 5 (1999) (noting that economic opportunities
can also be “influenced by the exercise of people’s freedoms”).
314. Cf. Declaration on Shared Values, supra note 221, para. 1 (declaring a commitment to reinforce
the understanding of shared values and promoting them as a means to achieving continental integration).

UDOMBANA_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/22/2021 8:47 PM

A STEP CLOSER

45

geometry, and special provisions respecting least developing members.315
These principles largely reflect the WTO framework.316 The rest of this
section examines some of these free market principles.
1. A Liberalized Market
Trade liberalization is the belief that free markets, unrestrained by
governments, generally result in the most efficient and socially optimal
allocation of resources.317 It entails the elimination of restrictions and
discrimination that impede the free movement of goods, services, persons,
and capital among the integrating states. Liberalization is based on two
concepts that are central to neo-classical theories on gains: comparative
advantage and economies of scale.318 Adam Smith and David Ricardo are
credited with laying the intellectual foundations for these concepts,319 though
Hobbes espoused liberal values before them.320 The concept of comparative
advantage, also known as ‘comparative costs,’ posits that a state should
produce goods in which it has an advantage over others. Even if a state can
make everything cheaper than others, it still benefits from focusing on goods
in which its relative, or comparative, advantage is greatest.321 That way, it
can raise living standards through trade. Smith puts it thus: “If a foreign
country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make
it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry,
employed in a way in which we have some advantage.”322 The concept of
315. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 5.
316. See, e.g., GATT 1994, supra note 65, arts. I–X; cf. GATT 1947, supra note 65, arts. I–IX
(discussing how these principles applied in the 1947 version of GATT).
317. See Denis O’Hearn, Tigers and Transnational Corporations: Pathways from the Periphery?,
in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM 117 (Ronaldo Munck &
Denis O’Hearn eds., 1999).
318. See STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 123, at 6; ZUBAIR IQBAL & MOHSIN S. KHAN, IMF,
TRADE REFORM AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA (1998); Kyle W. Bagwell et al., It’s a Question
of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 59 (2002). See generally MIRELA KEUSCHNIGG, COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1999) (providing an in-depth analysis
of Heckshcher-Ohlin factor proportions theory); Kwok Tong Soo, The Gains from External Scale
Economics and Comparative Advantage (Lancaster Univ. Mgmt. Sch., Economics Working Paper Series
No. 2013/007, 2013) (discussing possible gains from external scale economies for small countries
compared to larger countries through avenues like trade and the development of more specialized
production activities).
319. See generally ADAM SMITH, I–V AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (MetaLibri 2007) (1776) (describing capitalism as an emerging theory); DAVID RICARDO,
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMIES AND TAXATION (Dover Publications 2004) (1817)
(presenting an early description and overview of the theory of comparative advantage).
320. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 208 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
321. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 27 (9th ed.
2014).
322. SMITH, supra note 319, at 293.
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economies of scale builds on the idea that specialization in the production of
goods and services leads to lower (average) costs. It assumes that the cost of
tariff reductions in favor of a state is warranted only when a trading partner
obtains an offsetting benefit from a reciprocal tariff concession.323 The
laissez-faire and free trade policies have been built around these ideas.324 But
Ricardo’s idea has been challenged for its lack of empirical support, “its
assumptions about the inability of labor and capital to cross borders,” and
“its willful blindness to the role of slavery and colonialism in shaping the
British Empire’s comparative advantage.”325
Tariff reduction, such as customs duties and taxes or excise duties and
taxes, and the elimination of non-tariff barriers are the principal instruments
of trade liberalization.326 The AfCFTA Agreement, which embraces trade
liberalization,327 obliges its members to progressively eliminate all barriers
to trade in goods and liberalize trade in services.328 The assumption is that
such liberalization will boost intra-African trade.329 As a means of creating
a liberalized market in Africa, the Protocol on Trade in Goods aims to
enhance efficiency of customs procedures, trade facilitation and transit, and
cooperation in the areas of technical barriers to trade and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.330 Like with tariff barriers, the Protocol contains
323. Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Question of Justice: The WTO, Africa, and Countermeasures for
Breaches of International Trade Obligations, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2005) [hereinafter
Udombana, A Question of Justice]; Gerhard Loibl, International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 241, at 689, 690 n.1.
324. See SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 16 (2012)
(“Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage was (and still is) the premise used by advocates of trade
liberalization and division of labor.”).
325. Kombo, supra note 49, at 3.
326. HERDEGEN, supra note 81, at 66.
327. See AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(b) (listing the establishment of “a liberalised market
for goods and services through successive rounds of negotiations” as one of the objectives of the
agreement).
328. Id. pmbl., arts. 4(a)–(b); cf. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, art. 2(1) (declaring the
creation of a “liberalised market for trade in goods” as the “principal objective” of the Protocol); Protocol
on Trade in Services, supra note 24, pmbl. (stating the desire to create an integrated services market based
on “progessive liberalisation of trade in services”).
329. See, e.g., Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, art. 18(3) (“The liberalisation process
shall focus on the progressive elimination of the adverse effects of measures on trade in services as a
means of providing effective market access with a view to boosting intra-African trade in services.”).
330. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, arts. 2(2)(c)–(d); see also Schedules of Tariff
Concessions, Annex 1, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-First Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/11(XXXI)
(July 1, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37121-doc-draft_annexes_estbt_of_cfta.pdf;
Rules of Origin, Annex 2, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-First Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/11(XXXI) (July 1, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37121-doc-draft_
annexes_estbt_of_cfta.pdf; Customs Co-Operation and Mutual Administrative Assistance, Annex 3,
Assembly of the Union, Thirty-First Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/11(XXXI) (July 1, 2018),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37121-doc-draft_annexes_estbt_of_cfta.pdf;
Trade
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schedules on non-tariff barriers, including technical barriers on trade that it
seeks to eliminate.331
Liberalization under the CFTA must be managed with a focus on social
justice. The stakes are higher for Africa than a wholesale liberalization of its
markets, especially in the context of global trade. The so-called free market
creates a culture that facilitates a sense that the dailyness of life is all there is
to it. The market desanctifies place, commercializes time, alters and weakens
the concept of the sacred, and creates doubts about the larger purposes which
informs daily living.332 In our increasingly materialistic world, where almost
every area of human experience now passes through the measuring rod of
markets, some think that efficiency and profits should trump social justice.333
But even great economists, who preoccupied their minds with economic
efficiency, still recognized that social solidarity is a core human
characteristic. Adam Smith wrote: “How selfish soever man may be
supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”334 Free
trade is important, but it must be people-centered and must aim at human
welfare. It must give greater voice to the marginalized, including women
who often disproportionately bear “the burden of weakened social safety
nets.”335 Communitarianism, or Ubuntu philosophy of solidarity and

Facilitation, Annex 4, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-First Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/11(XXXI)
(July 1, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/37121-doc-draft_annexes_estbt_of_cfta.pdf.
331. Id. art. 2(2); see also Non-Tariff Barriers, Annex 5, Assembly of the Union, Thirty-First
Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/11(XXXI) (July 1, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/
37121-doc-draft_annexes_estbt_of_cfta.pdf; Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 6, Assembly of the
Union, Thirty-First Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/11(XXXI) (July 1, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/
files/documents/37121-doc-draft_annexes_estbt_of_cfta.pdf.
332. Robert E. Lane, Autonomy, Felicity, Futility: The Effects of the Market Economy on Political
Personality, 40 J. POL. 2, 19–22 (1978).
333. See J ACK D ONNELLY , INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 160 (1998) (saying a history of
market economics can lead to overlooking the flaws of such a system); cf. Jack Donnelly, Ethics and
International Human Rights, in E THICS AND I NTERNATIONAL A FFAIRS : E XTENT AND L IMITS 153
(Jean-Marc Coicaud & Daniel Warner eds., 2001) (discussing the benefits of efficient markets
in terms of benefiting the collective as opposed to being good for every single individual in
society); F. Amalric et al., Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: The Business Implications 1
(CCRS Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03/05, 2005) (quoting Milton Friedman, A Friedman
Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-ofbusiness-is-to.html) (discussing the view that businesses should just be focused on pursuing shareholder
value as opposed to enforcing human rights regulations).
334. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 11 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
335. Kombo, supra note 49, at 2.

UDOMBANA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

48

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/22/2021 8:47 PM

[Vol 31:1

responsibility,336 must drive CFTA’s implementation. The ‘I-Thou’
approach to inter-state and inter-personal relations is the only way Africa can
be fully authentic.337 Mbiti sums it up in his famous statement: “I am because
we are; and since we are, therefore I am.”338
2. Non-Discrimination
Non-discrimination is a central pillar in international economic law.
Discrimination connotes—
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity with respect to a like
product, in relation to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
the importation or exportation of a like product; or in relation to
international transfer of payments for exports or imports; or in relation to
any rules and formalities connected with the import or export of a
product.339

The prohibition of discrimination operates on two different levels. The
first is the Most-Favored-Nation treatment (MFN) principle. The second is
the national treatment principle. Both principles derive from treaty law,
meaning that they do not constitute general international law.340 They both
“serve equal competitive conditions in the market.”341 I begin with the MFN
treatment principle.
The MFN treatment is a relative standard aimed at creating an equal
playing field for all trading members. As used in modern commercial
treaties, it refers to “[t]he situation in which a state promises . . . to trade with
a particular partner on the most favourable tariff terms available for like
goods.”342 Aristotle’s concept of distributive justice may be used to further

336. See generally JOHANN BROODRYK, UBUNTU: LIFE LESSONS FROM AFRICA (2002) (exposing
ubuntu as a worldview to order society); MOGOBE B. RAMOSE, AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY THROUGH UBUNTU
(1999) (outlining how concepts such as law and justice can be understood through the philosophy of
Ubunto).
337. See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., T. & T. Clark 1937)
(1923) (presenting a philosophy of personal dialogue).
338. JOHN MBITI, AFRICAN RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 141 (Heinemann 2d ed. 1990) (1969).
339. ASIF H. QURESHI, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 359–60 (2011).
340. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 206 (2012) (arguing that the Most-Favored-Nation and national treatment principles are not
considered parts of customary international law).
341. HERDEGEN, supra note 81, at 66.
342. Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN Treatment), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (Elizabeth
Martin & Jonathan Law eds., 2006); cf. UNCTAD, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, in UNCTAD
SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II (2010) (providing an overview of
Most-Favored-Nation treatment provisions in international investment agreements by specifically
discussing the features of such provisions, their functions, how violations of said agreements play out in
practice, and policy options for implementation).
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explain the MFN treatment.343 Distributive justice demands that ‘equals’
should be treated equally and ‘unequals’ should be treated unequally.344
Since all states are sovereign and equal,345 the MFN demands equal treatment
on the international level. A state should extend to all other member states
the benefits it grants to a given state’s trade or investment relations (or
nationals, goods, services, and investments). A member should not, as
between other trading members, discriminate in relation to like products
originating from member states or in relation to like products destined for
different member countries.346 The closest analogy to the MFN treatment is
the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard in investment protection.347
The FET is infringed by a conduct attributable to a state and harmful to the
claimant, “if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic,
is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety.”348 The MFN standard does not apply to agreements with thirdparty states which are inextricably linked to a specific bilateral negotiating
situation with a particular set of rights and obligations.349
To create an equal playing field in intra-African trade, the AfCFTA
Agreement enshrines the MFN treatment principle,350 while its annexed
protocols work out the details. The Protocol on Trade in Services provides:
“With respect to any measure covered by this Protocol, each State Party
shall, upon entry into force, accord immediately and unconditionally to
services and service suppliers of any other State Party treatment no less
343. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Hugh Tredennik ed., J.A.K. Thomson trans.,
Penguin Books rev. ed. 2004) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
344. See id. at 118–20.
345. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1; AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(a); AEC Treaty, supra note 12,
art. 3(a); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7). Note that
formal or juridical equality is not the only criterion of equal treatment. See, e.g., Settlers of German Origin
in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6 (Sept. 10); Minority Schools in Albania,
Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 4 (Apr. 6); cf. ROLLAND, supra note 324, at 309
(“Formal equality and formal reciprocity makes for a very Talion-like legal system (an eye for an eye).
That legal culture is now becoming a source of inequity.”).
346. See QURESHI, supra note 339, at 359–60 (stating that discrimination involves “any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity with respect to a like product” in international trade).
347. See generally RUMANA ISLAM, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (FET) STANDARD IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN CONTEXT (2018) (examining
the interpretation of the FET standard in key arbitral awards affecting host developing countries, while
highlighting the variety of interpretation approaches adopted by investment tribunals).
348. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 97
(Apr. 30, 2004) (quoting Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 132
(June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2003)).
349. See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 69 (May 29, 2003).
350. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 5(g).
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favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any
Third Party.”351 Unlike the traditional MFN, the CFTA legal regime is
limited in its application. Its MFN treatment depends on similarities of the
respective bilateral situations resulting from a comparable negotiating
context. The AfCFTA Agreement requires that state parties “accord each
other, on a reciprocal basis, preferences that are no less favourable than
those given to Third Parties.”352 A state shall also afford opportunities to
other states “to negotiate preferences granted to Third Parties prior to entry
into force of this Agreement and such preferences shall be on a reciprocal
basis.”353 This provision is intended to preserve the acquis by preventing “a
country with a relatively closed economy from gaining additional market
access without making concessions in return.”354 Some commentators think
that “the lack of a traditional MFN clause in the AfCFTA Agreement” risks
creating “a patchwork of rights and obligations that differ across each” state
and “that the AfCFTA may not foster intra-African value chains” in a higher
degree.355
The national treatment principle demands equal treatment in a domestic
context. It prohibits discrimination against nationals, goods, services, and
investments of other states within the trading area.356 This principle will be
amplified in the next segment dealing with factor mobility. Suffice to note
that the AfCFTA Agreement also enshrines this principle.357 The Protocol on
Trade in Goods requires its state party to “accord to products imported from
other State Parties treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
domestic products of national origin, after the imported products have been

351. Id. art. 4(1).
352. Id. art. 18(1) (emphasis added); cf. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, art. 4(1)
(requiring State Parties to give “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” to one another); Protocol on Trade in
Services, supra note 24, art. 4(1) (requiring State Parties to accord “no less favourable” treatment to
service and service suppliers of other State Parties than they would accord to any non-State Party).
353. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 18(2) (emphasis added); cf. Protocol on Trade in Goods,
supra note 23, art. 4(3) (“Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent two or more State Parties from extending
to one another preferences which aim at achieving the objectives of this Protocol among themselves,
provided that such preferences are extended to the other State Parties on a reciprocal basis.”); Protocol
on Trade in Services, supra note 24, art. 4(3) (“Other State Parties shall be afforded opportunity to
negotiate the preferences granted therein on a reciprocal basis.”).
354. See LANDRY SIGNÉ & COLETTE VAN DER VEN, BROOKINGS, KEYS TO SUCCESS FOR THE
AFCFTA NEGOTIATIONS 4 (2019).
355. Id. at 5.
356. See HERDEGEN, supra note 81, at 67. See generally MATTIA MELLONI, THE PRINCIPLE OF
NATIONAL TREATMENT IN THE GATT: A SURVEY OF THE JURISPRUDENCE, PRACTICE AND POLICY (2005)
(using law and economics to describe the principle of national treatment in the GATT).
357. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, arts. 5(g)–(h).
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cleared by customs.”358 The Protocol on Trade in Services is similarly
worded.359
3. Factor Mobility
International trade and investment thrive with the ease of mobility of
persons, goods, and services within an integrated area. A sound international
trade policy must therefore maintain open borders among the integrating
states.360 Such a policy not only enhances trade among the parties. It also
promotes Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is valued for the activity
and employment it creates, the incentives it gives to domestic producers to
increase their efficiency, and the technology transfers it may generate.361 The
European Union (EU) remains the gold standard in this respect. Its economic
and political integration is unparalleled, a unique venture with no model in
history.362 The EU establishes an internal market with free movements of
persons, goods, services, capital and payments, with the power to harmonize
national laws to achieve a functioning internal market. Its successful
experiment in areas of free trade, customs, and common markets and the
EU’s sovereign role in matters such as labour law, consumer regulations,
antitrust, and environmental law,363 emboldened its members to move
towards a monetary union in 2002, with qualified success. Although ‘Brexit’,
a shorthand for Britain’s vote to leave the EU,364 has cast doubts upon the
EU’s future as an institution for regional governance, the EU still offers great
lessons for Africa.

358. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, art. 5; cf. GATT 1947, supra note 65, art. 1 (“[A]ny
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”).
359. Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, art. 20(1).
360. Cf. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 20 (codifying the aspiration of “seamless borders” among
African states).
361. Florence Jaumotte, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Agreements: The Market
Size Effect Revisited 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 04/206, 2004),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=879031; cf. Gaston Gohou & Issouf Soumare, Does Foreign Direct Investment
Reduce Poverty in Africa and are There Regional Differences?, 40 WORLD DEV. 75, 75 (2012) (reexamining the relationship between FDI inflows and welfare or poverty reduction in Africa).
362. See Patrick R. Hugg, Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum of Nice, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1293, 1339 (2001) (describing the European Union as a “new political form of
government”).
363. See John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 907, 940
(2006) (discussing the powers and organization of the European Union).
364. See Anushka Asthana et al., UK Votes to Leave EU After Dramatic Night Divides Nation,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/britain-votesfor-brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron (referring to Britain’s vote to leave the European Union as
“Brexit”).
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The AU’s commitment to the free mobility of persons, goods, and
services is an enduring dedication to the Pan-Africanism vision of economic
integration.365 Consequently, the AfCFTA Agreement establishes a single
market for goods and services that is facilitated by the free movement of
persons.366 The Agreement evinces an intention to build on the obligations
of AU members in the AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons.367
Indeed, the Protocol was adopted in the course of the CFTA negotiation,
meaning that the latter anticipated the former. It defines ‘free movement of
persons’ as “the right of nationals of a Member State to enter move freely
and, reside in another Member State in accordance with the laws of the host
Member State and to exit the host Member State in accordance with the laws
and procedures for exiting that Member State.”368 Its state parties recognize
that free mobility will facilitate the establishment of the CFTA.369 It will
enhance science, technology, education, and research, foster tourism, and
facilitate intra-African trade.370 It will promote mobility of labor, create
employment, and improve living standards of Africans. Finally, it will
facilitate the mobilization and utilization of Africa’s “human and material
resources to achieve self-reliant development.”371
Free mobility is based on principles of non-discrimination and
transparency.372 Thus, the Protocol prohibits a state from discriminating
against nationals of another member state entering, residing or established in
its territory, on the basis of their nationality, race, ethnic group, color, sex,
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin,
fortune, birth or other status.373 It accords equal protection to a citizen of
another state party entering, residing or established in a host state party. Of
course, such entry, stay or establishment must be in accordance with the
relevant national laws and policies of the host state.374 The Protocol falls into
the category of treaties that seek to create and maintain certain standards of
treatment of aliens and other groups, which usually refer to a national law as
365. See AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, supra note 239, pmbl. (declaring commitment
to free movement and African economic unity).
366. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(b).
367. Id.
368. Id. art. 1.
369. See id. pmbl. (“[T]he free movement of persons, capital, goods and services . . . are crucial for
deepening economic integration . . . .”).
370. AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, supra note 239, pmbl.
371. Id.
372. Id. art. 3.
373. Id. art. 4(1).
374. Id. art. 4(3); cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 241, at 612 (explaining how the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights exemplifies an informal prescription that is given legal significance by actions of
authoritative decision-makers).
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a method of describing the status to be created and protected.375 The use of
the word ‘nationals’ presumes persons having that status under the internal
law of the parties.376 Under the Protocol, for any entry and stay not exceeding
90 days, a visa will not be required. A national wishing to stay beyond 90
days will seek an extension in accordance with the procedures established by
the host state.377 The right of entry and residence accorded to nationals of
other states extends to their spouses and dependents, again in accordance
with the laws of the host state.378 The Protocol also guarantees to nationals
of member states the right of establishment,379 which includes the right to set
up in the territory of the host state: “(a) business, trade, profession, vocation;
or (b) an economic activity as a self-employed person.”380 These provisions,
together with those envisaging an African Passport,381 suggest an eventual
move towards a Community citizenship, without prejudice to citizenship
based on nationality.
The free mobility under the Protocol is to be progressively achieved in
three phases,382 but it does not affect more favorable provisions in national,
regional, or continental instruments. It also does not prevent the accelerated
implementation of any phase by a REC or sub-region.383 Although the
AfCFTA Agreement subordinates all other regional agreements to it384—
presumably to ensure that other trading arrangements do not negate the
CFTA’s objectives—it provides that state parties to other RECs, RTAs, and
custom unions that have attained higher levels of regional integration among
themselves should maintain such levels.385 This provision implicitly
acknowledges the progress that some RECs have achieved towards
establishing a common market. The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free
Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment,386 for example, spells
375. See Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15, para.
64–66 (Mar. 3); Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 49, at 45–47 (Aug. 11).
376. CRAWFORD, supra note 241, at 54.
377. AEC Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, supra note 239, art. 6.
378. Id. arts. 16(1)–(2). The Protocol mandates its State Parties to “gradually implement favorable
policies and laws on residence for nationals of other Member States.” Id. art. 16(3).
379. Id. art. 17(1).
380. Id. art. 17(2).
381. See id. art. 10(1) (obliging States Parties to adopt a travel document called an “African
Passport” and to work with the AUC to facilitate the processes towards its issuance to their citizens).
382. Id. art. 5(1).
383. Id. art. 5(3).
384. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 19(1).
385. Id. art. 19(2).
386. See, e.g., Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment, May
29, 1979, 1906 U.N.T.S. 32496 [hereinafter ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons].
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out the various stages to be undertaken to accomplish complete freedom of
movement, et cetera. This principle could be extended to the whole continent
if the political will exists.387 The sacrifice is not as great as it seems. To
facilitate the realization of the phases, CFTA organs should work together to
adopt policy measures that will reduce formalities to the bare essentials to
make free mobility and the right of residence and establishment within the
trading area easier. There should be measures that limit the scope of refusing
entry or terminating the right of residence. They should also adopt a model
driving license, including driver’s tests and medical standards, to facilitate
road travels within the Community. Better still, there could be a policy
decision requiring that licenses issued by one member state should be
recognized by others.388
4. Special and Differential Treatment (SDT)
Special and differential treatment is one instance where the principle of
sovereign equality of states is sidelined to accommodate extraneous factors.
Such factors include divergences in levels of development and unequal
capacities to tackle certain economic problems.389 As an exception to MFN
treatment, the principle recognizes the differential burdens of disciplines in
trade relations.390 The SDT has been an important part of global trade since
the inception of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1968.
Although it initially focused on creating development opportunities in
developing countries, it later shifted towards bridging the gap between the
trade liberalization expectations of the Uruguay Round and the actual
capabilities of developing country members.391 The WTO regime allows
waivers of members’ obligations under the GSP schemes.392 It accords
particular privileges to states that the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) classifies as Least Developed Countries

387. Kagame Report, supra note 228, at 5.
388. Cf. Council Directive 91/439, 1991 O.J. (L 237) 1 (EC) (as amended) (discussing the
community driving license model and the need for the licenses to be mutually recognized by member
states).
389. Phillipe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of
Inter-State Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 549, 551 (1999).
390. See generally Kevin Kennedy, Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries, in
1 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1523 (Patrick F.J.
Macrory et al. eds., 2005) (outlining special and differential treatment of developing countries in the
GATT–WTO system).
391. See ROLLAND, supra note 324, at 110.
392. GATT 1994, supra note 65, art. XXIV.
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(LDCs).393 The scheme offers them non-reciprocal preferences for goods
originating from their territory. It reduces tariff rates on their exports to
below those under the MFN treatment.394 Differential treatment could also
be based on considerations other than levels of economic development, such
as the share of international trade, resources under a state’s territorial
sovereignty, and geographic location.395 It could also take forms other than
trade concessions; for example, some agreements offer technical and
financial support to personnel of LDCs to participate in international
meetings.396
The CFTA regime enshrines the SDT principle. It recognizes that there
are different levels of development among African states and that flexibility
is needed to assist those with special needs.397 It permits trade preferences in
favor of such states. The Protocol on Trade in Goods provides:
In conformity with the objective of the AfCFTA in ensuring
comprehensive and mutually beneficial trade in goods, State Parties shall,
provide flexibilities to other State Parties at different levels of economic
development or that have individual specificities as recognised by other
State Parties. These flexibilities shall include, among others, special
consideration and an additional transition period in the implementation of
this Agreement, on a case by case basis.398

The SDT principle mirrors Africa’s shared value of solidarity. It
advances one of the aspirations in the AEC Treaty, which is the necessity of
sharing the advantages of cooperation among states in an equitable and just
manner to promote balanced development in all parts of Africa.399 The
principle should make it possible for bigger African economies to provide
enabling clauses in their bilateral and sub-regional undertakings in favor of
their smaller counterparts. As an illustration, the CFTA Assembly recently
approved a transitional period of five years or less for countries requiring
flexibility before the start of liberalization for Sensitive Products so that

393. UN List of Least Developed Countries, UNCDP [hereinafter UN List of LDCs],
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf (last
visited Oct. 8, 2020).
394. See Marrakesh AGT, supra note 28, art. IX(3) (permitting waivers of obligations imposed by
Articles I(1) and XIII(1)–(2) of GATT 1994). See generally Uché Ewelukwa, Special and Differential
Treatment in International Trade Law: A Concept in Search of Content, 79 N.D. L. REV. 831 (2003)
(discussing how flexibilities in tariff structures could lead to promoting the establishment of a particular
industry).
395. Cullet, supra note 389, at 552.
396. See, e.g., Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility,
art. 19(3), adopted July 7, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1283.
397. Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, pmbl.
398. Id. art. 6.
399. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, pmbl.
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applicable fixed tariffs for these products could be maintained.400 Such tariffs
are to be eliminated after “10 years for developing countries and 13 for the
least developed countries.”401 The potential obstacle to the effective
operation of the SDT principle in the CFTA is that the bigger economies
could use domestic measures to build concrete walls of sovereignty around
themselves, which will not permit mutual support to penetrate their borders.
The AU members must “tear down these walls,” in the spirit of their shared
values, in order to deepen cooperation and assist each other advance
equitable development.
A prior impact assessment will be necessary to ensure that the proposed
SDT will be effective. This should be done before the CFTA becomes
operational. The jury is still out on the impact of preferential trade on LDCs’
economies.402 Africa has enjoyed historically different forms of SDT, a
prominent example being the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
The Bush Administration enacted the Act as part of the Trade and
Development Act of 2000.403 The AGOA focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). It allows certain goods—especially textiles—from specified
countries to have quota-free and duty-free entry into the U.S.404 Studies show
that Africa’s exports to the U.S. under the AGOA have remained relatively
flat since the preferential trade regime began.405 SSA remains a geography
of poverty. Many states remain on the UNCTAD’s LDC list years after
enjoying such generous concessions. Thirty-three of the 47 countries
currently ranked as LDCs are from Africa.406 Only three African states have
graduated from the list: Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde in 2007, and
Equatorial Guinea in 2017.407 LDCs’ total share of global exports for 2017
was 0.96 percent.408

400. See, e.g., Decision on AFCFTA Feb. 2019, supra note 237, para. 5.
401. Id. (emphasis added).
402. Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special
and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 405, 407–10 (2005).
403. African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3702(1), (4)–(5) (2000).
404. UNCTAD, Handbook on the Scheme of the United States of America: Including Features of
the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) Programme, at 18, U.N. Doc. INT/97/A06 (May
2003).
405. See Davis, supra note 94, at 377 (evaluating the extent to which the AGOA increased imports
from eligible states to the U.S. from 2001 to 2015). Petroleum alone accounted for 65 percent or more of
U.S. annual imports from the eligible countries. Id.
406. UN List of LDCs, supra note 393.
407. Id.
408. UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, at 15, U.N. Doc. TD/STAT. 43, U.N. Sales No.
E.19.II.D.1 (2018).
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The main obstacles to successful SDTs are structural rather than
legal.409 Africa has not fully utilized preferential trade arrangements due to
capacity constraints and market access requirements, such as rules of
origins410 and product standards. Many states are unable to satisfy market
access requirements. Consequently, a few products that are economically
important for Africa are ineligible for export to the U.S. under the AGOA.411
Most states largely rely on a handful of primary products for much of their
foreign trade. Many of the unprocessed products that the LDCs export to rich
industrialized markets are of little interest to neighboring states with similar
economic profiles. Why should “State A” buy a product from “State B” when
it has it in its backyard? There may be more opportunities for trade if these
states could produce different goods or add real value to their primary
products; otherwise, SDT provisions in trade agreements will remain
ineffective.
C. The CFTA Organs
Effective institutional support is a sine qua non to the successful
implementation of regional trade agreements. In recognition of this
imperative, the AfCFTA Agreement provides for four organs with multi-task
functions over the CFTA.412 These organs are the Assembly, the Council of
Ministers, the Committee of Senior Trade Officials (CSTO), and the
Secretariat.413 All four organs are agents of the CFTA, though each will
exercise its own will. For example, although the Assembly members retain
their international personalities qua states, their acts qua organ are
attributable to the CFTA.414 Of course, the reverse is not the case.415 In this
section, I interrogate two of these four organs—the Assembly and the
Secretariat—due to space constraints. The Assembly is the legislative and
policy organ. The Secretariat is the administrative organ. I will also examine
how they will, or should, relate with each other.
409. ROLLAND, supra note 324, at 256.
410. Rules of origin permit states to determine the ‘nationality’ of a given product by distinguishing
between its different foreign sources. John Coyle, Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic
Policy: An Analysis of the Integrated Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,
29 YALE J. INT’L L. 545, 548 (2004).
411. Davis, supra note 94, at 379.
412. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, arts. 4(g), 9.
413. Id.
414. Cf. Case C-327/91, France v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. I-3666, at I-3674 (holding that an
agreement concluded by the European Commission would bind the European Council as a whole).
415. Some commentators think that this ‘distinct will’ theory is a fiction since the organization, in
practice, is little more than a tool in the hands of the members. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 11–12 (2d ed. 2009). The history of regional governance in Africa,
especially in relation to the AEC, appears to validate this observation. Id.
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1. The Assembly
The Assembly is “the highest decision-making organ” of the CFTA.416
This is merely a play on words because it is the same “supreme organ” of the
AU created under the AU Act417 that is designated as the CFTA Assembly.
Both the AU Act and AfCFTA Agreement define ‘Assembly’ as “the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union.”418
Unlike the AEC Treaty, which created an autonomous AEC Assembly apart
from the OAU Assembly,419 the CFTA has no independent supreme policy
organ. The AU Assembly is the default organ that will oversee the CFTA420
and provide strategic guidance and action plans for boosting intra-African
trade.421 The fusion of the supreme policy organ of the CFTA with that of
the AU is irregular. It creates a situation in which third states, those yet to
ratify the AfCFTA Agreement, will participate in deliberations and decide
on matters affecting the CFTA. The AU Assembly was created by a separate
treaty—the AU Act. Its functions and powers are expressly defined by the
treaty creating it.422 About half of the states that constitute the AU Assembly
are not parties to the AfCFTA Agreement. Only 28 states have ratified the
Agreement, representing 51 percent of the 55 AU members.423 Twenty-six
states are yet to ratify the AfCFTA Agreement, representing 48 percent of
AU membership.424 The extant AU Assembly Rules,425 elaborated pursuant
to the AU Act,426 governs AU Assembly deliberations. They will also, by
necessary implication, apply when the Assembly deliberates on the CFTA.
Indeed, the AU Rules have governed the Assembly’s deliberations since the
AfCFTA Agreement came into force. The Agreement contains no provision
on the rules of its Assembly. The quorum for the sessions of the Assembly

416. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 10(1).
417. AU Act, supra note 14, arts. 5(1)(a), 6(2).
418. Id. art. 1; AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 1.
419. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 7(1).
420. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 10.
421. Id. art. 10(1).
422. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 9.
423. AfCFTA, Ratification Status, supra note 34. By comparison, the AEC Treaty currently has 50
parties, excluding Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Somalia, and South Sudan. African Union
[AU], List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community (Dec. 15, 2017), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37636-sl-treaty_
establishing_the_african_economic_community.pdf.
424. Id.
425. African Union [AU], Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union [hereinafter AU
Assembly
Rules],
https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/6448/Rules%20of%20Proce
dure%20of%20the%20Assembly%2c%20Executive%20Council%2c%20PRC%20%26%20Statutes%2
0of%20the%20Commission%20_E.Pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (as amended).
426. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 8.
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under the AU Rules prescribe is two-thirds of total AU membership,427
which is 37 states. This means that the Assembly will need at least nine
additional states beyond the current 28 CFTA members to form a quorum
for any proposed deliberation and decision on the CFTA.
One of the fundamental principles of treaty law is that a treaty is only
binding on the parties to it.428 The maxim is pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt. But the AfCFTA Agreement has created an odd situation where
third states will participate in deliberations and adopt binding decisions on
the CFTA, with possible sanctions for noncompliance.429 Yet such decisions
will not bind those third states which participate in their making. The AU
Assembly has already taken many decisions on the CFTA since the AfCFTA
Agreement went into force, as discussed in different parts of this paper. I
submit that it is an anomaly for third states to deliberate and decide on
matters on which they are not bound. If the AU intended the CFTA to be an
integral part of its existing institutional infrastructure, it should have
dispensed with the ratification requirement. It should have simply provided
for automatic entry into force of the AfCFTA Agreement upon its adoption.
Having chosen ratification as the mode by which states agree to be bound,430
international law demands that only the ratifying states should bear rights
and obligations under the AfCFTA Agreement.431 A supplementary protocol
is needed to rectify this oddity.
The AfCFTA Agreement empowers the Assembly to interpret its
provisions.432 This is in consonance with international law, which allows
states and other subjects to interpret their legal obligations themselves. This
is based on the rule that the main interpreters of legal texts are the parties
bound by the legal rules.433 Self-interpretation is often the starting and ending
point. Unlike municipal systems, where a judge can be seized to settle a

427. AU Assembly Rules, supra note 425, Annex 1, r.6.
428. VCLT, supra note 30, art. 34. Where a treaty codifies customary international law, then third
States are bound not under the treaty but by the obligations that arise under customary law, though the
substance of obligations may be the same. See Military and Paramilitary Activties in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger.
v. Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
429. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 23(2).
430. VCLT, supra note 30, art. 14(1) (“The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed
by ratification when (a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification.”).
431. Id.
432. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, arts. 10(1)–(2); AU Act, supra note 14, art. 26. One can assume
that other CFTA organs will also have the power to interpret their jurisdictions, though the AfCFTA
Agreement has not expressly conferred such power on them. Id.
433. KOLB, supra note 31, at 129 (emphasis in the original) (referencing Pierre Klein, Les
prétentions des etats à la mise en oeuvre unilatérale du droit international, 43 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
INT’L [R.B.D.I.] 141 (2010) (Belg.)).
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matter with a binding decision, international judicial bodies have no
mandatory competence. Their jurisdiction rests upon acceptance by the
states involved in a given dispute. The AfCFTA Agreement, however,
requires the Assembly to take decisions on substantive issues by
consensus.434 A simple majority of states eligible to vote is needed on
questions of procedure, including whether or not a question is one of
procedure.435
2. The Secretariat
The effective functioning of the CFTA, to a large extent, will depend
on its Secretariat. If the execution of policies or decisions of the CFTA are
left to members or the policy organ only, without some forms of assistance,
its norms will likely remain on paper.436 The Secretariat will serve as the
CFTA’s administrative arm and clearing house. The Assembly is
empowered to establish the Secretariat, decide on its nature and location, and
approve its structure.437 But it is the CFTA Council, rather than the
Assembly, that is empowered to determine the roles and responsibilities of
the Secretariat.438 This arrangement is odd; one would think that the
establishing organ, in this case the Assembly, should determine the
responsibilities of the Secretariat. Meanwhile, the Secretariat is fitted with
international legal personality.439 It will be subject to obligations under
international law. It will have, in appropriate cases, capacity to enter into
agreements that create rights and duties. It will have locus standi to enforce
rights under international law. And it may be able to claim immunity from
jurisdiction in particular legal proceedings.440 It is not clear why personality
is conferred on the Secretariat rather than the CFTA itself. It appears that the
states intend the CFTA to function under the shadows of the AU rather than
independent of it. Regardless, it stands to reason that the conferment of
international personality on the Secretariat implies that the CFTA possesses
a similar personality. The organ of an institution cannot exercise legal
powers that are denied to the principal institution. Besides, the Secretariat

434. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, arts. 9, 14(1). The CSTO is required to refer “matters on which
it has failed to reach consensus” to the Council for consideration; and if the Council cannot reach
consensus, it shall refer such matters to the Assembly. Id. art. 14(2).
435. Id. arts. 14(3)–(4).
436. SANDS, supra note 45, at 302.
437. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 13(1).
438. Id. art. 13(6).
439. Id. art. 13(3).
440. Cf. JOHN O’BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (2001) (discussing how internanationl entities
may have legal personalities that afford them various abilities, one of which being the ability to claim
immunity “from jurisdiction in particular legal proceedings”).
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cannot be an actor on its own.441 Whatever it does will be attributed to the
CFTA.
The AfCFTA Agreement originally authorized the AUC to serve as an
interim Secretariat pending the formal establishment and operationalization
of the CFTA Secretariat.442 This provision is now redundant. The AU
Assembly decided at its 12th Extraordinary Session in July 2019 that Ghana
will host the CFTA Secretariat.443 It mandated the AUC to collaborate with
the Government of Ghana to finalize the host-country agreement and
facilitate “the expeditious transfer of the interim CFTA Secretariat to the
host-country with a view to accelerating the establishment of the Permanent
Secretariat by February 2020.”444 Ghana is a historic trading center in gold,
cocoa, and timber and the guardian of Africa’s collective memory.445 Its
choice as the Secretariat will transform this relatively peaceful and stable
West African country into a destination of some sorts for states and other
entities that will engage the CFTA Secretariat. In making that choice, the AU
might have considered Ghana’s political stability and good governance,
relative security, and its early ratification of the AfCFTA Agreement.446 The
choice of Ghana for the seat of the CFTA is also a fitting tribute to Kwame
Nkrumah, Ghana’s first President and foremost Pan-Africanist, who spent
his life advancing the political and economic integration of Africa and
nurtured the intellectual and philosophical foundations of Pan-Africanism.447
One good turn deserves another.
The Secretariat was expected to start functioning on March 31, 2020.448
It is already up and running in Ghana, at the time of this writing. Mr.
Mamkele Mene was appointed as the pioneer Secretary-General of the
CFTA in February 2020, for a four-year term.449 As the public face of the
CFTA, he is expected to manage the Secretariat, engage with stakeholders,
441. KLABBERS, supra note 415, at 169.
442. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 13(2).
443. See Decision on Hosting of the Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), para. 4, Assembly of the African Union, Twelfth Extraordinary Session,
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.2(XII) (July 7, 2019), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/37553-ext_
assembly_au_dec_1-3_xii_e.pdf.
444. Id. para. 6.
445. See Statement by Mahamat, supra note 1. Additionally, Ghana serves “not only as a home of
thought but also as a port of safety and freedom for fellow Africans fleeing persecution, and for people
of African descent seeking refuge or simply coming back home.” Id.
446. Ghana ratified the Agreement on May 7, 2018, less than two months after its adoption. See
AfCFTA, Ratification Status, supra note 34.
447. See generally NKRUMAH, supra note 4 (discussing the need to eliminate competition within the
African Common Market).
448. Decision on AfCFTA Feb. 2020, supra note 291, para. 7.
449. Id. para. 6.
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make other strategic collaborations, and mobilize resources for program
implementation. The AfCFTA Agreement is silent on the other staff of the
Secretariat and on the criteria for their appointments. It is safe to assume that
selection will be based on the AU Staff Regulations and Rules,450 drawn up
pursuant to Article 20 of the AU Act. The Regulations provide: “In any
recruitment, appointment, transfer and promotion, preference shall be given
to persons with the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity
alongside the need to promote gender balance and equality.”451 There is also
a requirement of geographical representation.452
The AU is responsible for funding the Secretariat. The Assembly will
approve its budget.453 This direct appropriation makes the Secretariat an
autonomous organ and guarantees its independence. Besides, the AfCFTA
Agreement provides that the Secretariat shall be autonomous of the AUC.454
It should function without being tied to the apron strings and bureaucracy of
the AUC. Since the Secretariat is fashioned to be international in character,
its staff are expected to discharge their duties impartially. They should
refrain from any action that might adversely reflect on their position as
international officials. They should not seek or accept instructions from any
government or any other authority external to the CFTA. They should work
for the interest of the CFTA as a whole.455 The AU Staff Regulations sums
up these guiding principles: “In the performance of their official duties, staff
members shall neither seek nor accept instructions from the government of
any Member State or from any other authority or source external to the
Union.”456 Of course, it is important for the CFTA members to also respect
the international character of the Secretariat. A recent incident in the AU,
though seemingly inconsequential, is capable of compromising that
international character. At its February 2019 meeting, the AU Assembly
450. Draft African Union Staff Regulations and Rules, Reg. 6.2(a), Assembly of the Union, Fifteenth
Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/4(XV) (July 25, 2010) [hereinafter AU Staff Regulations]; see also
Decision on the Staff Regulations and Rules, Assembly of the Union, Fifteenth Ordinary Session,
Assembly/AU/Dec.305(XV) (July 25, 2010), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9630-assembly_
en_25_27_july_2010_bcp_assembly_of_the_african_union_fifteenth_ordinary_session.pdf (adopting
the staff regulations and rules).
451. AU Staff Regulations, supra note 450, Reg. 6.4(b); see also id. Reg. 2.1(b); cf. U.N. Charter,
supra note 345, art. 101(3) (stating a commitment to diverse recruitment efforts by hiring from a wide
geographical basis).
452. See AU Staff Regulations, supra note 450, Reg. 6.4(c); cf. Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, supra
note 32, arts. 7(4)–(5) (requiring “equitable gender representation” in electing judges of the future Court);
AU Staff Regulations, supra note 450, r.28.8.
453. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 13(1).
454. Id. art. 13(4).
455. Cf. U.N. Charter, supra note 345, art. 100(1) (providing that the staff of the UN are “responsible
only to the Organization”); Revised ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 264, arts. 20(1)–(2).
456. AU Staff Regulations, supra note 450, Reg. 3.3(c).
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expressed special gratitude to Ghana for offering facilities for the CFTA
Secretariat and for donating $10 million to support its operations.457
Expressing appreciations through special resolutions appears to be the
practice of the AU, but some might not be necessary. While there might be
no strings attached to the gestures of the Ghanaian authority, the donation
creates an impression that Ghana is paying for the “favor” of hosting the
Secretariat in its territory. Its publicity by the Assembly also sends the wrong
signal; otherwise, why is Ghana the only country making such a donation?
Where are the other CFTA states?
The Secretariat’s neutrality could be compromised if the CFTA/AU
Assembly allows it to depend on handouts from a few powerful states for its
functioning. Going forward, any donation received towards the CFTA or its
Secretariat should go to the coffers of the AU until it is appropriated. A letter
of appreciation from the CFTA Secretariat should be sufficient without the
need for the AU to indulge in special resolutions.
IV. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIPS
Sub-regional integration organizations are pillars of the AEC and, by
extension, the CFTA. Effective continental coordination of the RECs and
harmonization of their policies will be crucial to the success of the CFTA.
Meanwhile, the AEC/CFTA functions on the principle of the sovereign
equality of its members.458 This accords with the Westphalian conception of
international law, which projects an authority-based view of society that is
largely facilitated by state action.459 A state is an organized sovereign
authority with exclusive membership, consciousness and ideals.460 Each state
possesses a territory, population, and government,461 and enjoys the rights
inherent in sovereignty, including the freedom to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems.462 Neither the AEC, the AU,
nor the CFTA is a state or even a super-state. Each exercises powers that are

457. Decision on AFCFTA Feb. 2019, supra note 237, at para. 6.
458. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 4(a); U.N. Charter, supra note 345, art. 2(1).
459. See PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 199–202 (1990).
460. See Iain Scobbie, Some Common Heresies About International Law: Sundry Theoretical
Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 241, at 80; JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND
THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 6 (1999) (“[S]tate authority [is defined as] the ability to exercise control
over a well-defined territorial space.”).
461. See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
462. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (Oct. 24, 1970).

UDOMBANA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

64

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/22/2021 8:47 PM

[Vol 31:1

defined by its constitutive treaty or implied by necessity.463 Although states
are the primary units of the international order, no common market can exist
if states are unwilling to pool aspects of their sovereignties and surrender
them to the Community. This Part examines the vertical and horizontal
relationship between the CFTA and RECs, including the continental efforts
to bring rationality or order into the policies and activities of Africa’s RECs.
It also examines the vertical and horizontal relationship between the CFTA
and states. Among other things, I call on the continental institutions, in
particular the judicial organs, to interpret Community laws and regulations
in a manner that limits state sovereignties and advances the integration goals
of the CFTA.
A. The Continental Free Trade Area and Regional Economic
Communities
A successful CFTA will be contingent on the integration processes by
the RECs. The RECs are generally seen as building blocks of economic
integration.464 They will serve as basic units to construct the CFTA. Indeed,
the AfCFTA Agreement seeks to build on the initiatives and developments
in respective states and RECs.465 This section examines the prospective
symbiotic relationship between the CFTA and RECs against the background
of the latter’s conflicting sub-regional trade policies. I argue that achieving
policy coherence among the RECs is crucial to the attainment of continental
integration objectives. I first examine the role of RECs in economic
integration before looking at the options for bringing rationality to their
activities.
1. Building or Stumbling Blocks?
Numerous RECs dot Africa’s landscape. Those that the AU officially
recognizes are the ECOWAS, the COMESA, the Economic Community of
Central African States (ECCAS), the SADC, the Inter-Governmental
Authority for Development (IGAD), the AMU, the Community of SaheloSaharian States (CEN-SAD), and the EAC.466 The list reflects Africa’s five
geographical spreads, namely North, West, Central, East, and Southern

463. For a discussion of the express and implied powers of international organizations, see
KLABBERS, supra note 415, at 60.
464. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 5(b); cf. Niamey Declaration, supra note 191, pmbl.,
para. 14 (recognizing Regional Economic Communities as facilitators of regional economic integration);
Declaration on Shared Values, supra note 221, pmbl. (describing RECs as “building blocks” for
developing and promoting a “continental agenda for integration”).
465. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(c).
466. For legal text, see Revised EAC Treaty, supra note 6.
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Africa.467 It is based on a long-established policy of encouraging viable
economic development projects on a regional basis. Some commentators,
however, think that these ‘spaghetti bowls’ are stumbling blocks to the
multilateral trading regimes.468 Others argue that Africa’s multiple RECs
reflects states’ desire to pick and choose various options. They insist that
multiple membership illustrates the flexibility and open-door policy that
Africa’s RTAs offer.469 Different RTAs offer benefits to members beyond
the reduction or removal of tariff barriers and the harmonization of trade
policies.470
That RECs are essential for the promotion of Africa’s socio-economic
development is not in doubt. They could play crucial roles in realizing the
integration agenda of the CFTA by serving as dynamic building blocks of an
effective integration into the Multilateral Trading System (MTS).471 They
could provide expertise for members to research trade facilitation in order to
participate effectively in multilateral negotiations and enhance trade
competitiveness.472 They could provide financial support to their members
to develop integration programs and generally meet their AEC/CFTA
timelines.473 They could help to advance Africa’s shared values in the areas
of democracy, good governance, human rights, gender equality, rule of law,
peace building, and humanitarian concerns.474 Africa’s RECs have indeed
been involved in regional security issues. When the cancer of conflicts
467. Cf. Resolution on the Division of Africa into Five Regions, Council of Ministers, Twenty-Sixth
Ordinary Session, CM/Res.464(XXVI) (Feb. 23, 1976), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9591council_en_23_february_1_march_1976_council_ministers_twenty_sixth_ordinary_session.pdf
(“Cognisant of the fact that there are similarities in nature and extent of certain problems facing particular
regions in Africa.”).
468. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ANNE O. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 2–3 (1995).
469. GATHII, supra note 115, at 67–68.
470. Id.; see also James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal
Regimes, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 571, 573 (2010) (listing a myriad of benefits that African
RTAs offer members, including the adoption of social economic and political objectives).
471. Declaration on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, para. 7, Assembly of the African Union,
Second
Ordinary
Session,
Assembly/AU/Decl.4(II)
(July
10,
2003),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9548-assembly_en_10_12_july_2003_auc_the_second_ordinar
y_session_0.pdf.
472. Decision on Trade Facilitation, para. 5, Executive Council, Seventh Ordinary Session,
EX.CL/Dec.204(VII) (June 28, 2005), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9629-council_en_
28_june_2_july_2005_council_executive_council_seventh_ordinary_session.pdf.
473. Cf. Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade, supra note 16, para. 5 (calling for RECs to
support Member States in boosting intra-African trade).
474. See Declaration on Shared Values, supra note 221, para. 10 (calling upon RECs to work with
the AUC and other AU organs to promote Shared Values); AU Protocol on RECs, supra note 60, pmbl.
(discussing the desirability for a synergy between the AU and RECs on the promotion of these shared
values).
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metastasised West Africa in the last decade of the 20th century, the
ECOWAS set up a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to address the
situations within the sub-region. The SMC midwifed the ECOWAS
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which forcefully intervened to
restore peace and order, notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone.475
The major problem with Africa’s RECs is their overlapping
membership and mandate, which dissipates manpower and resources in a
continent that can least afford them. Multiple membership poses a potential
conflict regarding which organization’s obligations should take
precedence.476 There is also the absence of clear principles of coordination
among them. This leads to what has been termed the ‘spaghetti bowl’—a
metaphor used to describe a system in which crisscrossing strands of bilateral
trade agreements create a tangled mess of restrictions and regulations,
ultimately disrupting rather than promoting free trade.477 Mistrust or
suspicion prevents most RECs from harmonizing their agricultural and trade
policies against global threats. To this day, there is an enduring attraction by
African governments to the colonizers’ ways. Some RECs establish separate
monetary zones to align with their former colonizers. The French
assimilation policy created a bond of dependence, loyalty, and gratitude. It
perpetuates neo-colonialism. The Franc Zone, a monetary and economic
zone consisting predominantly of former French colonies—though
Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau are also members together with
France—operates on the basis of fixed parity with the CFA franc, with
convertibility guaranteed by the French Treasury.478 Such conflicting
interests and loyalties could make Africa’s RECs become stumbling blocks
on the path to the Pan-African vision of CFTA.

475. See, e.g., Peter Arthur, ECOWAS and Regional Peacekeeping Integration in West Africa:
Lessons for the Future, 57 AFR. TODAY 2 (2010); Peter A. Jenkins, The Economic Community of West
African States and the Regional Use of Force, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL. 333 (2008).
476. See Udombana, A Harmony or a Cacophony?, supra note 64, at 206 (“Greater economic
integration at the global level has led to the further marginalization of those countries that are unable to
compete effectively.”).
477. On the ‘spaghetti-bowl’ effect, see generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM AT RISK (1991) (arguing that the concept of ‘trading by rules’ that underlies the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs will be undermined by increased accusations of unfair trade practice);
Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA “Spaghetti Bowl” Is
Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 197 (2006) (discussing trade disputes over multilateral trade rules and
regional trade deals litigated in NAFTA and WTO).
478. BORIS MARTOR ET AL., BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA: OHADA AND THE HARMONIZATION
PROCESS 285–86 (2d ed. 2007).
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2. In Search of Rationality
The coordination and harmonization of policies between the RECs is an
imperative to the gradual attainment of the continental integration agenda.479
The AfCFTA Agreement stresses the need to resolve the challenges of
multiple and overlapping memberships in order to expedite the regional
integration processes.480 Multiple legal instruments define the relationship
between the AEC and RECs, all seeking to establish some forms of
rationality or coherence between the regional and sub-regional integration
visions. These instruments include the AEC Treaty, AEC Protocol on the
Relationship between the AEC and the RECs 1998,481 AU Act, AU Protocol
on RECs,482 and the AfCFTA Agreement itself. Different OAU/AU organs
have also adopted soft laws on the activities of RECs. In 2006,483 the AU
Assembly urged regional economic institutions to coordinate and harmonize
their policies among themselves and with the AUC.484 It then placed a
moratorium on recognition of additional RECs, besides those officially
recognized.485
The AU Protocol on RECs, adopted in 2007,486 is the extant legal
framework for coordinating activities of RECs in Africa. This generic
Protocol applies to the mechanism that the parties establish to implement
measures in the economic, political, social and cultural fields to fulfil the
responsibilities placed on them by the AU Act and the AEC Treaty.487 The
AfCFTA Agreement falls into the list of instruments, by the ejusdem generis
rule of interpretation. The Protocol invokes the AEC Treaty and stresses the
need to promote closer cooperation among the RECs by coordinating and
harmonizing their policies, measures, programs and activities in all fields
479. Cf. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 3(l) (prioritizing coordination and harmonization as goals for
achieving the Union’s overall objectives).
480. Id. art. 3(h).
481. Protocol on the Relationship Between the African Economic Community and the Regional
Economic Communities, art. 3, Feb. 25, 1998, reprinted in 10 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157 (1998).
482. The Protocol terminates the AEC Protocol on RECs. AU Protocol on RECs, supra note 60, art.
34.
483. Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.112(VII) (July 1, 2006)
[hereinafter Decision on RECs], https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9555-assembly_au_dec_111133_vii_e.pdf.
484. Id. para. 4; cf. Accra Declaration, para. 2(a), Assembly of the African Union, Ninth Ordinary
Session, Assembly/AU/Decl.2(IX) (July 3, 2007), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/
249/Assembly%20AU%20Decl%202%20%28IX%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (noting
the reaffirmation of freedom of expression).
485. See Decision on RECs, supra note 483, para. 3 (suspending the recognition of new Regional
Economic Communities until further notice).
486. AU Protocol on RECs, supra note 60.
487. Id. art. 2.
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and sectors. 488 It stresses that integrating the policies of the RECs in a timely
manner will accelerate the establishment of an ACM, which is a prelude to
the AEC.489 The operative part of the Protocol lays down the overall goal,
which is to strengthen mutual relations among RECs, align their programs,
policies and strategies with those of the AU, provide for an effective
implementation of the Protocol, and the eventual absorption of RECs into
the AEC.490 The AU undertakes to discharge fully its responsibility for
strengthening RECs and coordinating and harmonizing their activities.491
Towards this end, the Protocol establishes a coordination mechanism to
develop common positions in negotiations at the multilateral level. 492 It
mandates RECs to review their treaties with a view to aligning them with the
AU instruments on economic integration. It establishes two organs to
coordinate policies, measures, programs, and activities of RECs and ensure
implementation of set objectives. These are the Committee on Coordination,
and the Committee of Secretariat Officials (CSO).493 The Protocol defines
their composition and functions and the implementation benchmarks for
RECs494 and the AU,495 among others.
In 2017, the AU Assembly again called for a clear division of labor and
effective collaboration among the AU, the RECs, the RMs, states, and other
continental institutions. Such collaboration, according to the Assembly,
should be based on principles of subsidiarity and comparative advantage.496
In 2018, the Assembly mandated the AUC to develop a proposal—in
collaboration with other stakeholders—on an effective division of labor
among these stakeholders, again based on the principle of subsidiarity.497 In
2019, the AU Assembly reiterated the necessity for rationality among RECs.
It directed the AUC to prioritize promoting inter-REC cooperation with a

488. Id. pmbl.
489. Id.
490. Id. art. 5(1).
491. Id. art. 5(2).
492. Id. art. 3(g).
493. Id. art. 6.
494. Id. arts. 12–13.
495. See id. art. 11 (targeting Regional Economic Communities and taking into account comparable
activities carried out under the AU Treaty).
496. Decision on the Outcome of the Retreat of the Assembly of the African Union on the Institutional
Reform of the African Union, Annex, para. A(ii), Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Eighth Ordinary
Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII) (Jan. 31, 2017), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/
32520-sc19553_e_original_-_assembly_decisions_621-641_-_xxviii.pdf.
497. Decision on the Institutional Reform, para. 54, Assembly of the African Union, Eleventh
Extraordinary Session, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XI) (Nov. 17, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/
decisions/36425-ext_assembly_dec._1-4xi_e.pdf.
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view to scaling up the African integration agenda.498 Welcoming the
preparatory work by the AUC, RECs and RMs on the proposal of the division
of labor between the various stakeholders, the Assembly directed them to
prepare more detailed proposals for consideration and adoption.499
Subsidiarity is a deeply rooted principle in Western thought. It has been
applied to a variety of law and governance issues, such as the environment,500
antitrust,501 and human rights.502 It is also a central constitutional principle in
the EU.503 It was first defined in a Papal Encyclical of 1931, stating: “it is an
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to
assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate
organizations can do.”504 There are two recognized tests for applying the
subsidiarity principle.505 The first is the negative sufficient attainment test,
which states that the Community should proceed only if a member cannot
achieve the set aim. The second is the positive better attainment test, which
states that the Community action is preferable to member state action if it
498. Niamey Declaration, supra note 191, para. 5; see also id. para. 10 (“Request[ing] [m]ember
states . . . [and] all other stakeholders to mobilize sufficient and sustainable resources . . . including
through utilizing the AU Partnerships towards the attainment of the continental integration Agenda . . .
.”).
499. Id. para. 6.
500. See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European
Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 846 (1993); William Murray Tabb,
Environmental Impact Assessment in the European Community: Shaping International Norms, 73 TUL.
L. REV. 923 (1999).
501. See, e.g., Rein Wesseling, Subsidiarity in Community Antitrust Law: Setting the Right Agenda,
22 EUR. L. REV. 35 (1997).
502. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003).
503. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1, pmbl., art. 5
[hereinafter EU Treaty] (resolving to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity).
504. Encyclical Letter from Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social Order para. 79 (May 15,
1931), http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadra
gesimo-anno.html. Many commentators trace the roots of this principle to an earlier encyclical, but it was
the 1931 Encyclical that first explicitly attached ‘subsidiarity’ to the idea. See Patrick McKinley Brennan,
Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine 7 (Villanova Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-3008, 2012), https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&params=/context/wps/article/1182/&path_info
(explaining
Pope Pius XI’s articulation of the principle of subsidiary function).
505. For judicial guidance on how the principle should be interpreted, see Case C-103/01, Comm’n
v. Germany, 2003 E.C.R. I-5386; Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health ex parte Brit.
Am. Tobacco (Inv.) Ltd. & Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-11550; Case C-377/98, Netherlands v.
Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. I-7149; Case C-84/94, U.K. v. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-5793. See generally
George A. Bermann, Proportionality and Subsidiarity, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET:
UNPACKING THE PREMISES 75 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002) (evaluating the
appropriateness of community legislative measures through the framework of subsidiarity and
proportionality).
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will bring demonstrable advantages.506 For the AEC/CFTA, RECs will be
authorized to only advance the integration agenda in specific areas.507 The
CFTA organs will not take action in those areas not falling within their
exclusive competences. They will do so only when their objectives cannot
be adequately achieved by individual states or RECs. And in the event of any
inconsistency between the CFTA and any REC, the former shall prevail to
the extent of the inconsistency.508
In sum, the CFTA handlers must continue to work towards resolving
the challenges of multiple and overlapping trade regimes. A vibrant
AEC/CFTA requires the harmonization of REC policies and the
strengthening of horizontal collaboration.
B. The Continental Free Trade Area and Member States
States are the primary units of the international order. The AfCFTA
Agreement takes this principle for granted; for example, it affirms the right
of states to flexibly regulate within their territories in order to achieve
legitimate policy objectives in such areas as public health, safety,
environment, public morals and the promotion and protection of cultural
diversity.509 But the AEC/CFTA, or the AU that oversees it, also possesses
the legal capacity to regulate on trade and related matters, with implications
on state sovereignty. The legal problem is that neither the AEC Treaty nor
the AfCFTA Agreement contain an explicit commitment to the idea that the
Community law shall be supreme. This and related problems deserve some
examination because they have legal and practical implications for the
effective functioning of the CFTA. It will be difficult to achieve the goals of
the AEC/CFTA unless we assume the supremacy of Community law. This
section examines, inter alia, the nature of relationship between the
AEC/CFTA and its members and the effect of Community law on national
legal systems.
1. Regional Order and Limitation of Sovereign Rights
Although states are the primary units of the international order, they
limit their sovereign rights when ratifying a constitutive treaty. The treaty
506. MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 100–01 (5th ed.
2008).
507. See AU Protocol on RECs, supra note 60, pmbl. (“Aware of the need to define the role of the
Union and that of the RECs taking into account the principle of subsidiarity and thereby allowing the
RECs to advance the integration agenda in specific areas . . . .”).
508. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 19(1).
509. Id. pmbl.; cf. Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, pmbl. (“Recognising the right of its
State Parties to regulate in pursuit of national policy objectives, and to introduce new regulations, on the
supply of services, within their territories, in order to meet legitimate national policy objectives . . . .”).
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principle that obligations can only arise from the consent of states and the
principle of sovereign equality are satisfied in a formal way when states join
an international organization.510 They are presumed to know that they are not
merely parties to a treaty but also members of a community. They are
presumed to consent to the institutional aspects of that membership. The
Community thus created represents what Kissinger calls “a new unit in a new
global version of the Westphalian system,” albeit as a regional, not a
national, power.511 The existence of this Community presupposes the
existence of a constitution, although the reverse is not necessarily true.512 It
will be impracticable to have an AEC/CFTA if the Community law is not
supreme and directly applicable or enforceable in states. The CFTA
objectives will be jeopardized if the executive force of Community law
should vary from one state to another in deference to domestic laws. It must
be assumed that the new system creates a new international legal order in
favor of which states have limited their sovereign rights in certain areas.513
There is a plethora of legal authorities to support the claim that the
AEC/AU/CFTA law will be a direct source of rights and duties for states.
The Community law will bind nationals of state parties, demarcate states’
competences on intra-African trade, and limit their traditional functions,
such as control over borders. In the Wimbledon Case,514 the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) rejected the argument that a treaty provision
could not deprive a state of the sovereign right to apply the law of neutrality
to vessels passing through the Kiel Canal. In Costa v. ENEL515 the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) held that the European Economic Community (EEC)
Treaty created its own legal system which, upon its entry into force, became
an integral part of the members’ legal system and which their courts must
apply.516 The Court took the same position in Amministrazione delle Finanze
v. Simmenthal,517 holding that “rules of Community law must be fully and
uniformly applied in all the Member States from the date of their entry into

510. CRAWFORD, supra note 241, at 452.
511. HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER 92 (2014).
512. Cf. SIMON CHESTERMAN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS: DOCUMENTS
AND COMMENTARY xxxiv (2d ed. 2016) (“It is demonstrably possible to have a community without a
formal constitution, but it is difficult to imagine a constitution without a community.”).
513. Cf. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, at 12 (concluding that Member States limited
their sovereign rights under the European Economic Community).
514. S.S. “Wimbledon” (U.K. v. Ger.), Judgment, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17).
515. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, at 593–94.
516. Id. at 595.
517. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Statto v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R.
629, para. 14.
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force and for as long as they continue in force.”518 Given that the African
integration schema closely follows the European model, it could be
submitted by analogy that the AEC/AU/CFTA law and the prospective
organic decisions and regulations will have direct effects in members’
municipal legal order.
The observance of the legal system of the Community is one of the
operating principles in the AEC Treaty.519 Each member undertakes to take
all necessary measures, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to
enact and disseminate such legislation as may be necessary for the
implementation of the Treaty.520 A regulation made pursuant to the AEC
Treaty has been approved by the Assembly, and it binds members, RECs,
and other subordinate organs of the Community.521 Such a regulation is
expected to be automatically enforceable thirty days after the date of their
signature and publication in the official Community journal.522 The AfCFTA
Agreement similarly empowers the CFTA Council to take decisions; and
while acting within its mandate, it may make regulations, issue directives
and make recommendations.523 Its decisions are binding on states,524 after
their adoption by the Assembly.525 The Agreement provides that states “shall
take such measures as are necessary to implement” the decisions of its
organs.526 The word ‘shall’ is an imperative.527 Thus, the AEC Treaty
provides for sanctions for any member which persistently fails to honor its
general undertakings or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of the
Community.528 The AU Act makes a similar provision on decisions and
policies of the AU.529
The pacta sunt servanda rule530 also bolsters the supremacy of
Community law over national laws. The rule is the cornerstone of
518. Id.
519. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 3(e).
520. Id. art. 5(2).
521. Id. art. 13(2).
522. Id. art. 13(3).
523. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, arts. 11(3)(j), (5).
524. Id. art. 11(5).
525. Id. But see Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, supra note 32, art. 31(1)(e) (implying that AU
“regulations, directives and decisions” are not binding because they are “subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law”).
526. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 11(6) (emphasis added).
527. See Shall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (explaining that “the mandatory sense” is
what drafters typically intend and what courts typically uphold).
528. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 5(3).
529. See AU Act, supra note 14, art. 23(2).
530. See VCLT, supra note 30, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.”).
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international relations.531 Its rationale is that there will be no reason for states
to enter into treaty obligations with each other if there is no reasonable belief
that they will honor their commitments.532 No one builds a stately habitation
unless he plans to live there. This axiomatic and self-evident rule is
reinforced by a corollary rule in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), providing that a state may not invoke its internal law as
justification for failure to perform its treaty obligations.533 This is also a selfevident rule.534 There is a general presumption that states do not intend to
repudiate their international obligations.535 Thus, State Parties to the AEC
Treaty, the AU Act, and the AfCFTA Agreement are not expected to take
unilateral measures that run afoul of the Community legal system that they
freely accept on the basis of reciprocity.536 Instead, they are expected to take
necessary domestic and other measures to honor their treaty obligations.537
2. Playing by the Rules
It is vital to the success of the CFTA that all parties should play by the
rules. The obligation to perform—and to be held to account for nonperformance—restrains a state’s ability to exercise its sovereignty.538 But
states are entitled to invoke their sovereign rights when interpreting their
obligations.539 As already shown, the AfCFTA Agreement gives the
Assembly the power to interpret its provisions. Like most treaties, the

531. See 3 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [Right of War and Peace] 438 (Marci-Michaelis
Bousquet ed., Lausannae 1752) (1625) (writing that the pacta sunt servanda rule lies at the center of
international legal order).
532. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 904 (6th ed. 2008).
533. VCLT, supra note 30, art. 27; see also Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory
Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21); VILLIGER, supra note 195, at 372 n.15 (noting
“the close relation between Articles 26 and 27” of the VCLT).
534. See Applicability of Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of June 26 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. 34, ¶ 57 (Apr. 26) (citing with
approval Greco-Bulgarian Communities, Advisory Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 32 (July
31)).
535. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIV), Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States (Dec. 12,
1974) [hereinafter CERDS].
536. Cf. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, at 594 (noting that the Treaty
allows State Parties to act unilaterally in only very narrow circumstances that are clearly listed).
537. Cf. Niamey Declaration, supra note 191 (urging state parties to align their national development
and reform strategies to the CFTA).
538. CRAWFORD, supra note 241, at 450.
539. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 17 (June 3); cf. AngloIranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 93, at 105 (July 22) (discussing Iran’s ability to
exclude disputes relating to the application of capitulatory treaties from the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion,
1950 I.C.J. 221, at 227 (July 18) (describing how the power in the provision at issue derives “solely from
the agreement of the parties” which must be strictly construed).
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Agreement contains ‘definitions’ clauses to aid interpretation.540 Still, states
sometimes use legal subterfuge to frustrate their treaty obligations under the
guise of self-interpretation.541 In determining the meaning and terms of the
AfCFTA Agreement and related treaties, the Assembly must interpret their
provisions to advance the objects and purpose of the AEC/CFTA, which is
economic integration through a robust intra-African trade.542 Any
interpretation that defeats this purpose will not be in good faith. In like
manner, the CFTA managers must not overstep their authority, otherwise it
will be difficult for states to comply with the Community rules. Even a
minimal surrender of sovereignty by states requires some guarantees that the
Community will play by the rules.
These potential tensions and conflicts between the CFTA law and states
underscore the urgent need for a continental court of justice. An independent
judicial institution, with jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Community
law, will ensure that states and institutional organs observe such law. The
existence of such a court will also make it possible to take enforcement
action against delinquent states and ensure compliance with Community law.
Regrettably, the Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol adopted to establish a continental
court of justice is presently in hibernation. The Protocol requires 15
ratifications for it to enter into force.543 Only seven states – Benin, Burkina
Faso, Congo, Gambia, Libya, Liberia and Mali – have ratified since its
adoption in 2008.544
V. MEASURING SUCCESS
Collective Africa deserves commendation for adopting the AfCFTA
Agreement and its supplementary protocols. These are bold steps in Africa’s
quest for regional economic integration and economic renewal. But
negotiating and adopting treaties are the easy parts. The hard part is the
degree to which the treaties produces observable and desired changes in state

540. See, e.g., AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 1; Protocol on Trade in Goods, supra note 23, art.
1; Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, art. 1; AU Act, supra note 14, art. 1; AEC Protocol on
Free Movement of Persons, supra note 239, art. 1; AEC Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1.
541. Some institutions attempt to solve this problem by establishing independent evaluation bodies.
The World Bank and the IMF established an Inspection Panel and an Independent Evaluation Office in
2001, respectively. See, e.g., IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE
(2d ed. 2000).
542. VCLT, supra note 30, art. 31(1).
543. See Sharm El-Sheikh Protocol, supra note 32, art. 9(1).
544. See African Union [AU], List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (June 18, 2020),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36396-sl-PROTOCOL%20ON%20THE%20STATUTE%20OF
%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20OF%20JUSTICE%20AND%20HUMAN%20RIGHTS.pdf.
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behavior.545 The CFTA will be judged by the question whether its rules and
institutions enjoy some salience within the society it governs and meet its
needs, rather than by classifying it as legal.546 The life of the law is
experience, not logic. In specific terms, the CFTA will be judged by the
qualitative increase in intra-Africa trade and competitiveness in global trade,
resulting in sustainable development and improved welfare of Africans. This
final part reflects on some tough choices that Africa needs to make to move
the CFTA from the realm of potential to reality.
A. Towards a Robust Intra-African Trade
The principal test of the CFTA’s effectiveness will be in its ability to
rejuvenate intra-African trade. That is its central objective.547 All other
objectives are ancillary or tangential. Low trade is Africa’s Achilles’ heel.
Agenda 2063 put the level of intra-African trade at 12 percent.548 Most of the
sub-regions export less than 5 percent of world trade.549 The major reason for
the low trade is the high tariff that businesses face when exporting within
Africa, not to mention non-tariff barriers examined in this paper. The intraAfrican tariff on goods is at an average of 6.1 percent.550Removing trade
barriers is critical to Africa’s economic growth. The UNECA estimates that
the CFTA could boost intra-African trade by 52.3 percent by eliminating
import duties, which could double if non-tariff barriers are also reduced.551
AfCFTA, the AU, RECs, states, the private sector, and international partners
deepen cooperation on multiple levels.552 These include addressing factor
mobility, building infrastructure, adding value to primary products, and
capacitating small and medium enterprises (SMEs), among the many issues
demanding attention. I briefly address these issues.

545. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 394 (2000).
546. Cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 241, at 11 (discussing the shift towards understanding law through
sociological theories and a more pragmatic natural law approach).
547. See AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(a).
548. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 26.
549. See African Statistical Yearbook 2018, 2018 Y.B. Afr. Stat. 86 (showing intra-African trade by
economic groupings in 2015).
550. UNECA, Q&A, supra note 36.
551. Id.
552. See Decision on the Launch of the Operational Phase of the African Continental Free Trade
Area (AfCFTA), para. 15, Assembly of the African Union, Twelfth Extraordinary Session,
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XII) (July 7, 2019) [hereinafter Decision on Operational Phase],
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/37553-ext_assembly_au_dec_1-3_xii_e.pdf.
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1. Addressing Factor Mobility
The CFTA states should urgently address all institutional and regulatory
capacity gaps towards implanting the common policy on factor mobility, as
contained in the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons. The AU itself
acknowledges that accelerating widespread labor migration within Africa
will contribute to development and poverty eradication.553 The problem is
that reality does not match rhetoric, a familiar one. Only 32 of the 55 AU
members have signed the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons.554 Of
the 32, only four have ratified: Mali, Niger, Rwanda, and Sao Tome &
Principe.555 This represents 7 percent of the total AU members, 8 percent of
the 50 State Parties to the AEC Treaty, and 14 percent of the 28 State Parties
to the AfCFTA Agreement and its protocols. Such a dispiriting attitude
evinces a lack of political commitment towards intra-African trade
liberalization. It exposes the huge gaps that still remain between rhetoric and
reality. The speedy ratification and implementation of the Protocol will bring
the CFTA closer to Africans, who are major stakeholders in the integration
project. There is really no sense in hastily ratifying the AfCFTA Agreement
to give birth to the CFTA and failing to ratify complementary treaties.
The AU and its members should work to dismantle the many colonial
structures that continue to imprison and enslave Africans. The arbitrary
internal divisions imposed by history have left Africans more isolated, both
from each other and the world as a whole.556 These colonial legacies are
inimical to trade. They stymie Africa’s quest for economic integration and
sustainable development. They also make the concept of an ‘African Union’
meaningless. Pre-colonial boundaries, where they existed, were not
conceived as immutable walls of division and separation. Such borders
served as transactional spaces for mediating various social, economic,

553. Declaration on Employment, Poverty Eradication, Inclusive Development in Africa, pmbl.,
Assembly of the Union, Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Decl.6(XXIV) (Jan. 30, 2015)
[hereinafter Declaration on Employment], https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9665-assembly_au_
dec_546_-_568_xxiv_e.pdf; cf. Communique, para. 3, Peace and Security Council, Six Hundred and Sixty
First Meeting, PSC/PR/COMM.1(DCLXI) (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/661-psccomm-23-02-2017free-movement-of-people-final.pdf (stressing the benefits of factor mobility, which far
outweigh the real and potential security and economic challenges that may be perceived or generated).
554. African Union [AU], List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol
to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right
of Residence and Right of Establishment (July 16, 2019), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36403sl-PROTOCOL%20TO%20THE%20TREATY%20ESTABLISHING%20THE%20AFRICAN%20EC
ONOMIC%20COMMUNITY%20RELAT. . ..pdf.
555. See id.
556. Kagame Report, supra note 228, at 3.
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political, and cultural flows.557 The establishment of a Single Air Transport
Market (SAATM) within the framework of Agenda 2063 is a step in the right
direction.558 The initiative seeks to fast-track intra-African mobility in the
field of air transport.559 As the market goes into operation, intra-African
market will operate without the need for bilateral air service agreements
between states.560 Under the arrangement, eligible airlines of AU members
and nationals operating under SAATM are entitled to file and fly on the basis
of their own economic considerations, without any hindrance. The only
consideration will be the safety and security of states’ aviation authorities,
RECs, and the Executing Agency.561 Twenty-three AU members declared
their commitment to the immediate implementation of the SAATM
decision,562 though some—like Nigeria—have no national carriers. States
that have signed up to arrangement will be required to abolish any provisions
in their Bilateral Air Services Agreement (BASAs) for intra-African air
services that are contrary to the SAATM. If properly funded, the SAATM
initiative will enhance connectivity across Africa and lead to sustainable
development of the aviation and tourism industry, with immense potentials
for job creation.563 There will be need to complement this initiative with a
masterplan for intra-African highways to facilitate the movement of persons
and goods.
2. Effective Domestic Institutions Underpinned by the Rule of Law
Domestic political support and credible institutions are essential to
facilitate free market objectives. Good institutions—rule of law, clear
property rights, stable means of exchange, efficient tax collection, the
provision of public goods, checks on official corruption—do not necessarily
guarantee economic prosperity, but they are the fundamental prerequisites

557. AFRICAN
UNION,
AUDIT
OF
THE
AFRICAN
UNION
para.
3
(2007),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.docx.
558. See Decision on the Establishment of a Single African Air Transport Market, para. 4, Assembly
of the Union, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.665(XXX) (Jan. 28, 2018),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/33908-assembly_decisions_665_-_689_e.pdf.
559. Id. para. 8(i).
560. Id.
561. Id. para. 8(ii).
562. See id. para. 5. The AU Assembly has mandated its Commission, the Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) and the Champions, in collaboration with other air transport stakeholders, to take
effective steps to engage states which have not yet signed on to the Single Air Transport Market
(SAATM). Id. para. 8(iv).
563. Id. para. 4.
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for sustained economic growth.564 Without them, it is difficult to maintain
long-term savings and investments.565 Law is said to be the enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the guidance of rules.566 It is a product of
sustained purpose aimed at facilitating the conduct of public and private life.
It is also predictive of state behavior; and the ability to predict presupposes
order of some sort.567 As Herdegen explains:
The normative framework for an effective market economy requires
essential elements, such as the guarantee of private property, the freedom
of contract, and an effective legal protection of fundamental and other
subjective rights. In addition, institutional mechanisms which secure
economic stability and which restrain self-serving influences of particular
societal groups are also vital for a functioning market economy.568

Africa must be competitive even within the continent in order to survive
the onslaughts of neo-liberalism. Competitiveness depends largely on
national legal orders. Africa must construct a system that recognizes
individual property rights and integrate those rights into a floundering
economy. Every developed nation went through the transformation from
predominantly informal, extra-legal, ownership to a formal, unified legal
property system, which converts assets into capital and allows people to
leverage property into wealth.569 Africa is rich in assets, but poor in capital.570
Assets cannot become capital unless governments guarantee good
governance anchored to the rule of law. The law of contracts must be clear
on the ownership of assets and legal titles. That way, assets can be sold,
bought, mortgaged, or converted into other assets.571
Allied to the need for clear rules on ownership of assets is the necessity
to develop legal and policy frameworks to reduce the cost of doing business
in Africa. States must create an environment conducive to private sector
growth. A robust infrastructure will also catalyze manufacturing, skills
development, technology, research and development, investments, tourism,

564. Adam S. Posen, The Post-American World Economy: Globalization in the Trump Era,
FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/postamerican-world-economy.
565. Id.
566. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (1964).
567. See id.
568. HERDEGEN, supra note 81, at 165.
569. See id.
570. PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 84, 87 (2007).
571. See C. K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING
POVERTY THROUGH PROFITS 78–79 (2004).
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and ultimately enhanced intra-African trade.572 The AU indicates that by
2063, Africa will have the necessary infrastructure—including high-speed
railway networks, roads, shipping lines, sea and air transport—to support
Africa’s accelerated integration and growth, technological transformation,
trade, and development.573 This sounds noble, except that a continent that is
lagging behind in all indices of development cannot afford such long-term
dreams. Africa needs to develop trade-related infrastructure and productive
capacity-building programs immediately, not in the far future. The art of life
consists in tackling each immediate evil as best as we can. AfCFTA members
should identify focal points at national and regional levels and dedicate
technical and financial resources to drive the CFTA.
3. Adding Value to Africa’s Primary Products
Africa must diversify its production capabilities in order to add value to
its primary commodities and expand regional value chains. Africa’s market
is broad enough to absorb the products of planned industrial and agricultural
growth, but its prosperity lies in developing local capacities for processing.
Technological innovation and technology diffusion hold enormous potential
for accelerated agricultural productivity. What most states are familiar with
is to export raw materials and import manufactured goods in addition to
services. Foreign multinationals also control the extractive industries that
many states depend on for their foreign exchange earnings. Yet four decades
earlier, these states pledged “to eliminate all forms of foreign economic
exploitation particularly that practiced by international monopolies so as to
enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their
national resources.”574
The AU commits to ending hunger by 2025, by strengthening
development policies as an effective investment in human capital.575 It also

572. See Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 25; cf. AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, pmbl.
(acknowledging that an adequate infrastructure will create an expanded and secure market for goods and
services of its State Parties).
573. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 25.
574. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 21(5), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
[hereinafter African Charter]; see CERDS, supra note 535, art. 2(2)(a); cf. G.A. Res. 626 (VII), Right to
Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, pmbl. (Dec. 21, 1952) (discussing the need to encourage
under-developed nations to use their own natural resources); G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (Nov. 25, 1966) (noting that developing countries are in better
positions to exploit and market their own natural resources).
575. See Decision on the Report of the High Level Meeting on Renewed Partnership for a Unified
Approach to End Hunger in Africa by 2025 Under the Framework of the Comprehensive Africa
Agricultural Development Programme, Executive Council, Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session,
EX.CL/Dec.797(XXIV) (Jan. 28, 2014), https://amcomet.wmo.int/sites/default/files/field/doc/events/
ex_cl_dec_783-812_xxiv_e.pdf.
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commits to reducing stunting in children to 10 percent and underweight to 5
percent by that target date, and to focus on “the first 1000 Days as the only
window of opportunity during which permanent and irreversible physical
and mental damage would be avoided.” 576 It has promised to pursue
agriculture-led growth as a main strategy to achieve targets on food and
nutrition security and shared prosperity, and to halving poverty by 2025,
through inclusive agricultural growth and transformation.577 The Assembly
has called on the AU Commission (AUC) and the NEPAD Planning and
Coordinating Agency (NPCA) to conduct agricultural review process on a
biennial basis, beginning from 2017, and to report on progress.578 The AU
further promises that by 2025, Africa will banish the hand-hoe method of
farming and expand the introduction of modern agricultural systems,
technology, practices and training.579 Beyond these commitments, Africa
needs coherent policies and institutional governance arrangements at
national and regional levels—including inter-sectoral coordination—in
order to unlock the huge potentials in agriculture, generate wealth, and create
social benefits. To achieve food security, states must embark on aggressive
agrarian reforms—including the conditions of land ownership—as well as
tax, credit, and investment policy reforms.580 To create value chains, states
must use better seeds and methods of cultivation and irrigation. They must
also create agro-allied industries. Perpetually exporting primary products to,
and importing finished goods from, the West is the textbook definition of
underdevelopment. As Africans proverbially ask, when you pledge your
piece of land in order to buy a bunch of brooms, what benefit do you derive
from killing flies with it?
The AU should assist those of its members facing challenges in
collecting and compiling quality data to report progress on all goals and
targets set in the Malabo Declaration. It should work with its members and
international partners, including the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO), to facilitate agro-research and processing. Some commentators
suggest that future trade preferences by advanced countries to African states
should prioritize the development of productive capacities and value addition
of indigenous products. This could be done through targeted investments that
help states to produce goods that have higher value. It could help Ghana, for
example, to transition from exporting cocoa beans to chocolate and allied

576.
577.
578.
579.
580.

See Decision on ALN, supra note 258, para. 4.
Malabo Declaration, supra note 255, paras. 1, 3.
Id. para. 9(d).
Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 72(e).
See Udombana, Keeping the Promise, supra note 257, at 172–73.
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products.581 I agree. Indeed, some countries—notably Burundi, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania,
and Zambia—have already developed strategies for targeted policy options
to address constraints on capacity and production inputs for selected sectors
in the context of AGOA.582 The setback caused by Covid-19 to trade and the
multilateral system could be a blessing in disguise. It could make state parties
speed up the CFTA processes and rethink their value chains and reduce their
reliance on traditional supply routes.583 “Sweet are the uses of adversity.”584
4. Capacitating Africa’s Small and Medium Enterprises
Collective Africa should mainstream small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) into the CFTA so they can meaningfully contribute towards
realizing Africa’s integration objectives. SMEs are critical to Africa’s
economic growth and job creation.585 They are potential seedbeds for
technological acquisition and innovation, which could enable them to
compete with foreign conglomerates operating in Africa. But Africa’s SMEs
exist largely in the realm of potential. They experience many constraints such
as difficulties in access to credit and capital markets and low levels of
technical and managerial skills. There are also constrains of inadequate
information and low productivity and quality. They face constraints of
insufficient access to markets, to new technologies, and lack of transport and
communications infrastructure.586 They face constraints of inappropriate,
inadequate, or overly burdensome registration, licensing, reporting, and
other administrative requirements, which sometimes constitute disincentives
to the hiring of personnel.587 Insufficient support for research and
development as well as difficulties in access to public and private
procurement opportunities further constrain many SMEs.588
In 2019, the AU Assembly supported a capital increase for the African
Development Bank (ADB) to enable it fulfill its role in furthering the African
integration agenda.589 The AU could work with its members to identify
581. Joy Kategekwa, Rethinking the AGOA Model: How to Create a Pro-Structural Transformation
of the U.S.-Africa Trade Partnership, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 372, 372 (2017).
582. Davis, supra note 94, at 379–80.
583. See Statement by Mahamat, supra note 1 (arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic presents an
opportunity for African Union countries to reshape their trade policies).
584. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT, act 2, sc. 1.
585. Declaration on Employment, supra note 553, pmbl.
586. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], R189—Job Creation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Recommendation, paras. 6(2)(a)–(g) (June 17, 1998), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R189.
587. Id. para. 6(2)(h).
588. Id. paras. 6(2)(i)–(j).
589. Niamey Declaration, supra note 191, para. 13.
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SMEs with continental investment potentials and assist them to access loans
from the ADB, with government guarantees. Such loans will enable them to
improve local contents and increase their chances of effective participation
in intra-African and even global trade. Giving preferences to SMEs in the
award of government contracts should be seen as legitimate, “even if in doing
so, multinational firms are in effect discriminated against.”590 I reiterate my
call for the adoption of a charter on SMEs. Such a charter should commit
governments to provide incentives and equal opportunities for all SMEs to
access credit facilities and foreign exchange.591 It should also commit
governments to simplify and decentralize business registration in order to
eliminate the link between high administrative burdens and corruption. And
it should contain obligations for periodic reports by states on the
implementation of policies contained in it.592
B. Competitiveness in Global Trade
The AfCFTA Agreement is primarily designed to facilitate intraAfrican trade, but it has a secondary objective—to enhance competitiveness
of Africa’s economies in the global market.593 The Protocol on Trade in
Services also desires to “harness the potential and capacities of African
services suppliers . . . to engage in regional and global value chains.”594
These provisions have a context. Collective Africa has consistently fallen
short in global trade. Its share hovers around 2 percent.595 The challenges
that prompted many states to join the WTO, such as limited trade
opportunities, remained several years after their accessions to the WTO
agreements.596 Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations, several African states opened up their economies to global
markets in the name of ‘free trade’. They lowered custom tariffs and made
labor markets more flexible, often at the expense of local industries. In
consequence, Africa has become a dumping ground for cheap, sometimes
toxic, foreign goods, even as advanced countries refuse to commit to
reciprocity on trade-related issues. The West and China continue to give
generous agricultural subsidies to their farmers and to adopt other
protectionist measures.597 They get away with un-free trade and craftily win

590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.

STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 123, at 273 (emphasis in original).
See Udombana, Social Rights Are Human Rights, supra note 140, at 225–26.
See id. at 226.
AfCFTA AGT, supra note 21, art. 3(f).
Protocol on Trade in Services, supra note 24, pmbl. (emphasis added).
See Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 26.
See Udombana, A Question of Justice, supra note 323, at 1166.
See id. at 1175.
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exemptions for various forms of subsidies while prohibiting those that
developing countries apply.598 Subsidies and other protective measures
depress Africa’s primary products.
Africa seldom balances its trading accounts, due to trade deficits. The
continent realized US$ 426,432 million in 2017 in global merchandise
exports in which China alone accounted for US$ 2,263,346 million, while
the U.S. accounted for US$ 1,546,273 million.599 Africa’s imports trade flow
for the same period was US$ 533,600 million, representing a deficit of 28
percent of total exports.600 To balance these deficits, states usually resort to
loans from the IFIs. The IMF Articles of Agreement,601 for example,
empowers the Fund to provide financial assistance to help members address
their balance of payment problems.602 Africa has been in a perpetual debt
crisis. It borrows not only to meet its international trade obligations but also to
service interest on old debts, which are largely determined by the industrial
countries that control the IFIs. The world’s poorest countries have about $140
billion in general government debt-servicing obligations to settle by the end
of 2020, including $10 billion in foreign currency.603 The median debt level
of Sub-Saharan Africa—as defined by the IMF—is above 50 percent of its
GDP.604 Ghana spends 5.7 percent of her GDP on debt servicing, but 1.1
percent on health-care.605 The ratio for Kenya is 3.9 to 2.1 percent, and 1.6
to 0.5 percent for Nigeria.606 Africa’s economic geometry is a vicious cycle of
low trade plus loans plus debts, which equals poverty.
The asymmetrical trade and monetary relationships between the
developed and developing countries create dependency.607 They erode, in
particular, Africa’s ability to pursue policies that would serve its key

598. Cf. STIGLITZ, supra note 135, at 244 (describing how industrial nations advocate for opening
markets, yet continue to provide billions in subsidies to their own producers).
599. Data, WTO, https://data.wto.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
600. Id.
601. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S.
39 (amended effective Jan. 26, 2016).
602. See id. art. 5(3).
603. Alonso Soto, African Union May Ask Wealthy Nations for Commercial-Debt Relief,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-23/africanunion-may-ask-wealthy-nations-for-commercial-debt-relief.
604. Africa in the Red: Increasing Debt in Many African Countries is a Cause for Worry,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/08/increasingdebt-in-many-african-countries-is-a-cause-for-worry.
605. Soto, supra note 603.
606. Id.
607. Cf. James Crawford, Foreword to ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW xii (2005) (describing the creation of indebtedness and dependence as
a result of nations obtaining independence from their colonizers).
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developmental objectives.608 This double standard partly explains why many
developing countries have been reluctant to further open up their economies
in the name of free trade. The WTO launched the Doha ‘Development’
Rounds (DDR) in 2001 to place development at center of the multilateral
trading system. The development-related issues that mattered most to
developing countries were agriculture, intellectual property, public health,
and preferential trade.609 The AU, acting on behalf of its members, urged the
industrial countries to show greater flexibility in their negotiating positions.
It emphasized that the success of the DDR will depend on its development
outcomes.610 The industrial countries failed to make meaningful progress on
these issues; instead, the DDR was dominated by topics and proposals that
were of little relevance to developing countries. It eventually collapsed after
many missed deadlines, thus foreclosing international economic law’s
promise of justice, at least in the short term.611 Its collapse signals that any
future multilateral trade arrangement that ignores the special concerns of
developing countries will fail. To ignore such issues is to perpetuate
dependency.
In July 2019, the AU Assembly directed the African Ministers of Trade
(AMOT) to work towards ensuring that an African secure the position of the
WTO’s Director General when it becomes vacant after August 31, 2020.612
The AU hopes that such an African head will help to strengthen the
multilateral trading system,613 possibly in Africa’s favor. This is a legitimate
aspiration. African states are entitled to seek greater participation in
governance institutions in which they belong, but their economic challenges

608. See Decision on WTO Negotiations, para. 4, Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary
Session, Assembly/AU/Dec.119 (July 1, 2006), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9555assembly_au_dec_111-133_vii_e.pdf (emphasizing that failure to meet Africa’s trade negotiation needs
will undermine developmental objectives).
609. See Michael Friis Jensen & Peter Gibbon, Africa and the WTO Doha Round: An Overview, 25
DEV. POL’Y REV. 5 (2007) (listing major impediments to African trade).
610. Declaration on the Outcome of the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference Held in Hong Kong,
China, 13–18 December, 2005, paras. 4–5, Sixth Ordinary Session, Assembly/AU/Decl.1(VI) (Jan. 23,
2006), https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1661/Declaration_Outcome_WTO_Minister
ial_Conference_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
611. See The Doha Round Finally Dies a Merciful Death, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/9cb1ab9e-a7e2-11e5-955c-1e1d6de94879 (explaining how tensions between
developing countries, developing countries’ rapid economic development, and the American farm lobby’s
influence sunk the Doha Round). See generally Christian Bjornskov & Kim Martin Lind, Where Do
Developing Countries Go After Doha? An Analysis of WTO Positions and Potential Alliances, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 543 (2002) (tracking the disagreements between WTO members); SUNDHYA PAHUJA,
DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011) (arguing that international law has legitimated
interventionism in the Third World).
612. Decision on Operational Phase, supra note 552, para. 16.
613. Id.
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extend beyond WTO headship. Having an African as Director-General is
good, but it will not guarantee Africa’s greater participation in the global
economic and financial system. It also will not rectify the supply-side
constraints caused by domestic factors, as already examined. Africa’s
competitiveness in the global market will be best guaranteed through value
addition to its primary products and by addressing other internal challenges
like poor infrastructure.
C. Sustainable Prosperity and Peace
The success of the CFTA will be measured by the substantive freedoms
that Africans enjoy.614 A successful economic integration will undoubtedly
bolster economic growth in Africa, but whether it will engender individual
prosperity is a different question. Economic growth is not synonymous with
individual prosperity or happiness any more than the resources a person
commands is indicative of his quality of life. Development means growth
plus change, and change implies objectives beyond simple GDP growth.
SSA has experienced high GDP growth in the past that did not translate into
proportionate job creation and poverty reduction. The AU celebrated the
sustained levels of growth that Africa experienced over the last decade in
2015,615 but it admitted in the same year that a significant proportion of the
population remains vulnerable to challenges of economic marginalization,
hunger and malnutrition.616 Poverty is exploding in Africa, caused, in part,
by hunger and malnutrition;617 likewise insecurity, a by-product of poverty,
is exploding. At the time of writing, it is estimated that 23 million more
Africans will be pushed to extreme poverty in 2020 due to the Covid-19
pandemic.618 The poverty that afflicts Africa is not an equal opportunity
offender. Inequality abounds due to what Collier calls “the survival of the
fattest” and the law of the jungle of electoral competition in the presence of

614. See SEN, supra note 313, at 18. See generally THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum &
Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (addressing issues of defining and measuring the quality of life); KARL MARX,
ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Martin Milligan trans., Progress Publishers 1959)
(1932) (arguing for a reorientation of economic preoccupations).
615. Agenda 2063, supra note 52, para. 66(b).
616. See Declaration on Employment, supra note 553, pmbl. (noting with concern the persistent
employment and health issues in Africa); Malabo Declaration, supra note 255, pmbl. (noting how the
failings of the African agricultural sector have contributed to the continent’s employment and health
issues).
617. See Malabo Declaration, supra note 255, pmbl. (reflecting that hunger and malnutrition lead
to poverty by causing low productivity and educational attainment).
618. Gilbert F. Hounbo, What’s Needed to Protect Food Security in Africa During COVID-19,
WORLD ECON. F. (May 29, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/what-s-needed-to-protectfood-security-during-covid-19/.
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abundant resources.619 Poverty and inequality persist because of the failure
to address several governance issues, including the structural problems that
could reduce dependence on social safety nets.
Africa needs a sound economic theory that drives development in order
to free its vast populations who are trapped in extreme poverty.620 More
importantly, it needs a consequentialist ethic to respond to human needs,
perhaps something akin to Mill’s utilitarianism.621 Mill interprets moral
value in terms of the usefulness of an action in promoting the greatest good
of the greatest number.622 His philosophy contrasts that of Nietzsche, the
German philosopher who renounces compassion as a sign of life-denying
moral ill-health that threatens to prevent humanity from reaching its full
potential.623 Mill’s utilitarianism goes back to Aristotle’s theory of the
morally happy life.624 At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
notes that “wealth is obviously not the good that we are seeking, because it
serves only as a means; i.e., for getting something else.”625 For him, human
happiness is the supreme good, “the end to which our actions are directed.”626
Happiness “makes life desirable,” and is “something perfect and selfsufficient.”627 The AU similarly aims to “promote co-operation in all fields
of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples.”628 The
AU and its members should disenchant such provisions from the realm of
the ideal to the actual. As a point of departure in the drive towards meeting
human security, Africa should adopt a common policy on employment and
social security. A continent that is moving towards economic integration
must have common positions on issues that are vital to sustainable

619. COLLIER, supra note 570, at 42.
620. Cf. JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET (2008)
(presenting a new paradigm that offers practical solutions to problems stemming from overpopulation).
621. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher ed., Hackett Publishing Co.
2d ed. 2001) (1863) (defining utilitarianism and arguing for its acceptance as a moral standard).
622. See id. at 7 (“[A]ctions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they
tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”).
623. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY passim (Keith Ansell-Pearson
ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1887).
624. ARISTOTLE, supra note 343.
625. Id. at 9.
626. Id. at 15.
627. Id. at 14–15
628. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 3(k) (emphasis added); cf. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, pmbl.
(“Conscious of [the] duty to develop and utilize the human and natural resources of the Continent for the
general well-being of our peoples in all fields of human endeavour.”) (emphasis added).
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development and prosperity. Certain matters cannot be left to the discretion
of individual Member States.629
Peace is both a constitutive and an instrumental freedom. It is cherished
in and by itself, but it is also a means to sustainable development.630 The
AEC Treaty stresses the necessity to promote peace and stability as
prerequisites for the implementation of Africa’s development and integration
agenda.631 The reverse is also true. There can be no peace and stability
without development and prosperity. Some commentators insist that open,
free, and non-discriminatory trade promotes interstate relations that are
conducive to peace. Where goods do not cross borders, according to Frederic
Bastiat, soldiers will.632 The EU experiment may not have ushered in a
“perpetual peace” in Europe, but it promoted political stability by bolstering
peace between the continent’s major powers after centuries of conflicts.633
The interdependence and economic prosperity that the EU ushers contribute
to the relative peace that prevailed after two world wars in a single century.634
The EU has achieved this goal largely because its founders pragmatically
appealed to citizens’ economic empowerment rather than pander to mere
nationalistic or even racial ideals. In essence, a successful CFTA will
engender economic growth and prosperity and advance peace and stability
in a continent that is plagued by political instability and conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION: A STEP CLOSER
The adoption of the AfCFTA Agreement is a step closer in the on-again,
off-again, rhythm towards regional economic integration. The success of the
CFTA will depend on continuous political, financial, and technical support,

629. Cf. Udombana, Social Rights Are Human Rights, supra note 140, at 223 (advocating for the
AU to be a pivot and catalyst in promiting social rights in Africa).
630. See generally POST-CONFLICT SECURITY, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM
AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, EUROPE AND NEW ZEALAND (Christine Atieno & Colin Robinson eds., 2019)
(examining linkages between regional stability, development, and peace in post-conflict societies); THE
SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: PEACE, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT (Ramses Amer et al. eds.,
2012) (providing a comprehensive account of conflict, security, and peace through eight geographical
case studies, two of which are based in the DRC and South Africa).
631. AEC Treaty, supra note 12, pmbl., art. 3(f).
632. See HERDEGEN, supra note 81, at 22 (attributing the quote to nineteenth-century philosopher
Frederic Bastiat).
633. See MARK BAIMBRIDGE ET AL., CURRENT ECONOMIC ISSUES IN EU INTEGRATION 1 (2004)
(noting that the process of European integration has helped avert conflict and consolidate peace after the
Second World War).
634. See generally VOLKER R. BERGHAHN, EUROPE IN THE ERA OF TWO WORLD WARS: FROM
MILITARISM AND GENOCIDE TO CIVIL SOCIETY, 1900–1950 (2006) (detailing the emergence of Europe’s
liberal capitalist model of society).

UDOMBANA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

88

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/22/2021 8:47 PM

[Vol 31:1

including timely provision of information by the members.635 Decades of
failed legal and policy measures at the national and regional levels make
cynicism a natural ally. If—an uppercase IF—faithfully implemented, the
CFTA could orchestrate a major geopolitical shift and reposition Africa to
play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations,
which is one of the AU objectives.636 Collective Africa must give the CFTA
the priority it deserves. There will be bumps on the road, but each step
forward will do a lot of good for millions of Africans. No doubt, the docket
of the AU is filled with issues demanding urgent attention, but the AU should
prioritize the CFTA and work with its members to achieve set targets. Even
if the AU has enough assets to fuel its long-term goals, it does not have the
luxury of time to kitchen-sink all of Africa’s problems. States that have not
yet ratified the relevant regional treaties should do so and get on board the
integration ship. If they fail to do so before the new official trading in January
2021 begins, more than half of Africa might be out of the trading area. This
could have negative economic consequences for the individual countries in
particular and for Africa in general. Those countries will remain exposed to
the cold winds of globalization, not to mention marginalization in global
trade. It will also mean that Africa’s avowed common position on
international trade and other issues is a farce.
Collective Africa must ensure, through deliberate and targeted public
support, that all segments of the population—including women, youth,
transport operators, labor unions, employers, artisans, the physically
challenged, and minority groups—participate meaningfully and benefit from
the growth and transformation opportunities of the CFTA.637 The final cause
of the CFTA must be the welfare of citizens, millions of whom still struggle
daily for survival in an insupportable environment. Any rule or policy that
misses this end cannot justify its existence. Good intentions alone are not
enough, because humanity is not abstract. The concept of Pan-Africanism
implicates one citizenship. The point of African unity should not be in mere
rhetoric, but in “the practical need to work together to realise concrete
improvements in the well-being and security of our citizens which would be
unattainable working as individual entities.”638 The neglect of a people at the
foot of a society’s ladder indicts failed policies and leadership, both at
national and regional levels. Such neglect will make it difficult for

635. See Decision on Operational Phase, supra note 552, para. 14 (calling upon members to assume
these obligations).
636. AU Act, supra note 14, art. 3(i).
637. Cf. Malabo Declaration, supra note 255, pmbl. (resolving to ensure that all population
segments participate and benefit from growth and transformation opportunities).
638. Kagame Report, supra note 228, at 3 (emphasis added).
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protagonists of an African Renaissance to gain traction among the many
skeptical citizens, let alone critics.

